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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of increasing trading frequency in financial markets on
allocative efficiency. We build and solve a dynamic model of sequential double auctions
in which traders trade strategically with demand schedules. Trading needs are generated
by time-varying private information about the asset value and private values for owning
the asset, as well as quadratic inventory costs. We characterize a linear equilibrium with
stationary strategies and its efficiency properties in closed form. Frequent trading (more
double auctions per unit of time) allows more immediate asset reallocation after new in-
formation arrives, at the cost of a lower volume of beneficial trades in each double auction.
Under stated conditions, the trading frequency that maximizes allocative efficiency coin-
cides with the information arrival frequency for scheduled information releases, but can
far exceed the information arrival frequency if new information arrives stochastically. A
simple calibration of the model suggests that a moderate market slowdown to the level
of seconds or minutes per double auction can improve allocative efficiency for assets with
relatively narrow investor participation and relatively infrequent news, such as small- and
micro-cap stocks.
Keywords: trading frequency, allocative efficiency, high-frequency trading, double auction
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1 Introduction
Trading in financial markets has become significantly faster over the last decade. Today, elec-
tronic transactions for equities, futures, and foreign exchange are typically conducted within
milliseconds or microseconds. Electronic trading, which is faster than the manual processing
of orders, is also increasingly adopted in the over-the-counter markets for debt securities and
derivatives, such as corporate bonds, interest-rate swaps, and credit default swaps. Exchange
traded funds, which trade at a high frequency similar to stocks, have gained significant market
share over index mutual funds, which only allow buying and selling at the end of each day.
The remarkable speedup in financial markets raises important economic questions. For
example, does a higher trading frequency necessarily lead to more efficient allocations of assets?
What is the socially optimal frequency at which financial transactions should take place? And
how does this optimal trading frequency depend on asset characteristics? Answers to these
questions would provide valuable insights for the ongoing academic and policy debate on market
structure, especially in the context of high-speed trading (see, for example, Securities and
Exchange Commission (2010)).
In this paper, we set out to investigate the welfare consequence of speeding up transactions
in financial markets. In our model, the trading process is modeled as an infinite sequence of
double auctions. The shorter is the time interval between two consecutive auctions, the higher
is the trading frequency of the market. As an advantage, a high-frequency market enables
investors to respond quickly to new information and start the reallocation of assets. As a
disadvantage, a high-frequency market is also “thinner,” in the sense that strategic investors
become more sensitive to price impact (in a manner described below). This tradeoff, together
with the timing of information arrivals, generates the optimal trading frequency that maximizes
allocative efficiency.
Model, equilibrium, and efficiency. Our model works roughly as follows. A finite
number (n ≥ 3) of strategic traders trade a divisible asset in an infinite sequence of uniform-
price double auctions, held at discrete times {0,∆, 2∆, 3∆, ...}. At an exponentially-distributed
time in the future, the asset pays a liquidating dividend, which, until that payment time, evolves
according to a jump process. Over time, traders receive private informative signals about
common dividend shocks, as well as idiosyncratic shocks to their private values for owning the
asset. Traders’ values for the assets are therefore interdependent, creating adverse selection
in the trading process.1 Traders also incur quadratic costs for holding inventories, which is
equivalent to linearly decreasing marginal values. A trader’s dividend signals, shocks to his
private values, and his inventories are all his private information. In each double auction,
traders submit demand schedules (i.e., a set of limit orders) and pay for their allocations at the
market-clearing price. All traders take into account the price impact of their trades and are
forward-looking about future trading opportunities.
Our model incorporates many salient features of dynamic markets in practice. For example,
asymmetric and dispersed information about the common dividend creates adverse selection,
whereas private-value information and convex inventory costs introduce gains from trade. These
trading motives are also time-varying as news arrives over time. In this framework, the number
1Throughout this paper, “adverse selection” covers situations in which different traders have different pieces
of information regarding the same asset. In our context “adverse selection” may also be read as “interdependent
values.”
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of double auctions per unit of clock time, 1/∆, is a simple yet realistic way to model trading
frequency in dynamic markets. We emphasize that a change of trading frequency in our model
does not change the fundamental properties of the asset, such as the timing and magnitude of
the dividend shocks.
Our first main result is the characterization of a linear equilibrium with stationary strategies
in this dynamic market, as well as its efficiency properties. In equilibrium, a trader’s optimal
demand in each double auction is a linear function of the price, his signal about the dividend,
his most recent private value, and his private inventory. Each coefficient is solved explicitly in
closed form. Naturally, the equilibrium price in each auction is a weighted sum of the average
signal about the common dividend and the average private value, adjusted for the marginal
holding cost of the average inventory.
Because there are a finite number of traders, demand schedules in this dynamic equilibrium
are not competitive. To reduce price impact, traders engage in “demand reduction,” thereby
strategically understating how much they are willing to buy or sell at each price. The practical
consequence of demand reduction is that a large order is split into many smaller pieces and
executed slowly over time. Consequently, the equilibrium asset allocations after each auction
are inefficient, although they converge gradually and exponentially over time to the efficient
allocation. This convergence remains slow and gradual even in the continuous-time limit.
We show that the convergence rate per double auction increases with the number of traders,
the arrival intensity of the dividend, and the variance of the private-value shocks; but the
convergence rate per auction decreases with the frequency of auctions and with the variance of
the common-value shocks. These comparative statics are useful input for our analysis of the
optimal trading frequency.
Welfare and optimal trading frequency. Characterizing the optimal trading frequency
in this dynamic market is the second primary contribution of our paper.
Increasing trading frequency involves the following important tradeoff. On the one hand,
a higher trading frequency allows traders to react to new information and start to adjust
their asset holdings more quickly. This effect favors a faster market. On the other hand,
under a higher trading frequency traders are less willing to suffer the price impact in any
given period (since they anticipate more trading opportunities in future periods), which leads
to less aggressive demand schedules in each period and hence a lower volume of beneficial
asset reallocations. Although a higher trading frequency by definition generates more double
auctions per unit of clock time, we prove that, conditional on news arrivals, the efficiency benefit
of having more trading opportunities is more than offset by the inefficiency of less aggressive
demand schedules in each round. This effect favors a slower market.
Given these two effects, the allocative inefficiency in this dynamic market relative to the
first best can be decomposed into two components: one part due to strategic behavior and the
other due to the delayed responses to new information. The optimal trading frequency should
strike the best balance between maximizing beneficial asset reallocations and minimizing delays
in reacting to new information.
We show that the optimal trading frequency depends critically on the nature of information
arrivals. Scheduled information arrivals (e.g., earnings announcements and macroeconomic data
releases) and stochastic information arrivals (e.g, mergers and geopolitical events) generate
dramatically different optimal trading frequencies.
If new information about dividend and private values arrives at scheduled time intervals,
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we prove that the optimal trading frequency cannot be higher than the arrival frequency of
new information. In the natural case that all traders are ex-ante identical, the optimal trading
frequency then coincides with the information arrival frequency. Intuitively, if information
arrival times are known in advance, aligning trading times with information arrival times would
reap all the benefit of immediate response to new information, while maximizing the volume of
beneficial asset reallocations. Under the natural condition that all traders are ex-ante identical,
the optimal trading frequency coincides with the information arrival frequency.
By contrast, if new information arrives at unpredictable times, it is important to keep the
market open more often to shorten delays in responding to new information. Indeed, we show
that under Poisson information arrivals and if traders are ex-ante identical, the optimal trading
frequency is always higher than
(
nα
2
− 1
3
)
µ, where:
• the parameter n is the number of traders;
• the (endogenous) parameter α ∈ (0, 1] is decreasing with the level of adverse selection, in
a sense to be made precise in the model section; and
• the parameter µ is the expected arrival frequency of information.
That is, the optimal trading frequency 1/∆∗ exceeds the information arrival frequency µ by a
factor of at least nα
2
− 1
3
, which is a large number if the asset has broad investor participation
(large n) and mild adverse selection (α close to 1). In numerical calculations, the lower bound(
nα
2
− 1
3
)
µ turns out to be very tight. As n or µ becomes large, the optimal trading frequency
increases without an upper bound, approaching continuous trading in the limit.2
To concretely illustrate the application of the model and its market-design implications,
we calibrate the Poisson-information-arrival version of the model to U.S. futures and equity
markets. We use four liquid futures contracts (the E-mini S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury
futures, the Euro futures, and the crude oil futures) and a sample of 146 stocks that cover,
in approximately equal proportions, large-cap, medium-cap, small-cap, and micro-cap firms.
Using reasonable calibrations of the model parameters (some of which are based on proprietary
summary statistics provided by the CFTC and NASDAQ), we find that all four futures contracts
and the top half of the sample stocks (sorted by the calibrated optimal trading frequency) have
a model-implied optimal trading frequency ranging from a few auctions per second to a few
thousand auctions per second, depending on the asset and the method of calibrating news
arrival rate. By contrast, stocks with relatively low investor participation or with relatively
infrequent arrivals of news, such as small- and micro-cap stocks, tend to have a robustly lower
optimal trading frequency, in the order of seconds or minutes per double auction. We caution
that these optimal trading frequencies should be interpreted in their orders of magnitude but
not the exact level.
A policy implication from our analysis is that a moderate market slowdown can improve
allocative efficiency in small- and micro-cap stocks, but not necessarily for larger stocks and
liquid futures contracts. More generally, sound market design in terms of trading speed should
take into account the heterogeneity of assets in terms of investor participation and the arrival
frequency of relevant news, among others. Our model and calibration method could also be used
to evaluate the potential benefit of speed regulation in other securities and derivatives traded
on electronic markets, such as ETFs, options, government securities, and foreign exchange, as
2To clarify, continuous trading in our model means continuous double auctions, not a continuous limit order
book. The latter is effectively a discriminatory-price auction, not a uniform-price auction.
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well as in other jurisdictions. For assets that are currently traded over-the-counter but are
moving toward all-to-all electronic trading—such as corporate bonds, interest rate swaps, and
credit default swaps—our model suggests that if exchange-like trading in these markets were
deemed desirable by investors and regulators, periodic auctions could be a more natural place
to start than continuous trading.
Relation to the literature. The paper closest to ours is Vayanos (1999), who studies
a dynamic market in which the asset fundamental value (dividend) is public information, but
agents receive periodic private inventory shocks. Traders in his model are also fully strategic.
Vayanos (1999) shows that, if inventory shocks are small, then a lower trading frequency is better
for welfare by encouraging traders to submit more aggressive demand schedules.3 We make two
main contributions relative to Vayanos (1999). First, our model allows interdependent values
and adverse selection. Adverse selection makes trading less aggressive and reduces the optimal
trading frequency. Second, our model identifies two channels of welfare losses: One channel,
strategic behavior, agrees with Vayanos (1999), whereas the other, delayed responses to news,
complements Vayanos (1999). The latter channel is absent in Vayanos (1999) because inventory
shocks and trading times always coincide in his model. We show that the latter channel can
lead to an optimal trading frequency that is much higher than the information arrival frequency
if information arrivals are stochastic. Our result also generates useful predictions regarding how
the optimal trading frequency varies with asset characteristics.
Rostek and Weretka (2015) study dynamic trading with multiple dividend payments. In
their model, traders have symmetric information about the asset’s fundamental value, and
between consecutive dividend payments there is no news and no discounting. In this setting,
they show that a higher trading frequency is better for welfare. Our contribution relative to
Rostek and Weretka (2015) is similar to that relative to Vayanos (1999). First, our model
applies to markets with adverse selection. Second, we show that the optimal trading frequency
depends on the tradeoff between strategic behaviors and delayed responses to news.
Our notation of welfare and those of Vayanos (1999) and Rostek and Weretka (2015) are
allocative efficiency. This is different from the welfare question in a number of high-frequency-
trading studies, namely whether investments in high-speed trading technology are socially
wasteful (see Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015), Pagnotta and Philippon (2013), Budish,
Cramton, and Shim (2015), and Hoffmann (2014)).
Among recent models that study dynamic trading with adverse selection, the closest one
to ours is Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2014). They study a continuous-time trading model in
which agents have pure common values but “agree to disagree” on the precision of their signals.
Although the disagreement component in their model and the private-value component in ours
appear equivalent, they are in fact very different. As highlighted by Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang
(2014), in a disagreement model the traders disagree not only about their values today, but
also about how the values evolve over time; this behavior does not show up in a private-value
model. Therefore, their model and ours answer very different economic questions: Their model
generates “beauty contest” and non-martingale price dynamics, whereas our model is useful for
characterizing the optimal trading frequency.
3Vayanos (1999) also shows that if inventory information is common knowledge, there is a continuum of
equilibria. Under one of these equilibria, selected by a trembling hand refinement, welfare is increasing in trading
frequency. Because our model has private information about inventories, the private-information equilibrium of
Vayanos (1999) is a more appropriate benchmark for comparison.
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2 Dynamic Trading in Sequential Double Auctions
This section presents the dynamic trading model and characterizes the equilibrium and its
efficiency properties. Main model parameters are tabulated in Appendix A for ease of reference.
2.1 Model
Timing and the double auctions mechanism. Time is continuous, τ ∈ [0,∞). There
are n ≥ 3 risk-neutral traders in the market trading a divisible asset. Trading is organized as
a sequence of uniform-price divisible double auctions, held at clock times {0,∆, 2∆, 3∆, . . .},
where ∆ > 0 is the length of clock time between consecutive auctions. The trading frequency
of this market is therefore the number of double auctions per unit of clock time, i.e., 1/∆. The
smaller is ∆, the higher is the trading frequency. We will refer to the time interval [t∆, (t+1)∆)
as “period t,” for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Thus, the period-t double auction occurs at the clock time
t∆. The top plot of Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the double auctions.
Figure 1: Model time lines. The top plot shows times of double auctions, and the bottom plot
shows the news times (dividend shocks, signals of dividend shocks, and private value shocks).
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We denote by zi,t∆ the inventory held by trader i immediately before the period-t double
auction. The ex-ante inventories zi,0 are given exogenously. The total ex-ante inventory, Z ≡∑
i zi,0, is a commonly known constant. (In securities markets, Z can be interpreted as the
total asset supply. In derivatives markets, Z is by definition zero.) As shown later, while the
equilibrium characterization works for any ex-ante inventory profile {zi,0}ni=1, in the analysis of
trading frequency we will pay particular attention to the special case in which all traders are
ex-ante identical (i.e., zi,0 = Z/n).
A double auction is essentially a demand-schedule-submission game. In period t each trader
submits a demand schedule xi,t∆(p) : R → R. The market-clearing price in period t, p∗t∆,
satisfies
n∑
i=1
xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆) = 0. (1)
In the equilibrium we characterize later, the demand schedules are strictly downward-sloping
in p and hence the solution p∗t∆ exists and is unique. The evolution of inventory is given by
zi,(t+1)∆ = zi,t∆ + xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆). (2)
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After the period-t double auction, each trader i receives xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆) units of the assets at the
price of p∗t∆ per unit. Of course, a negative xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆) is a sale.
The asset. Each unit of the asset pays a single liquidating dividend D at a random future
time T , where T follows an exponential distribution with parameter r > 0, or mean 1/r. The
random dividend time T is independent of all else in the model.
Before being paid, the dividend D is unobservable and evolves as follows. At time T0 = 0,
D = D0 is drawn from the normal distribution N (0, σ2D). Strictly after time 0 but conditional
on the dividend time T having not arrived, the dividend D is shocked at each of the clock times
T1, T2, T3, . . . , where {Tk}k≥1 can be deterministic or stochastic. The dividend shocks at each
Tk, for k ≥ 1, are also i.i.d. normal with mean 0 and variance σ2D:
DTk −DTk−1 ∼ N (0, σ2D). (3)
We will also refer to {Tk}k≥0 as “news times” or “information arrival times.” Thus, before the
dividend is paid, the unobservable dividend {Dτ}τ≥0 follows a jump process:
Dτ = DTk , if Tk ≤ τ < Tk+1. (4)
Therefore, at the dividend payment time T , the realized dividend is DT .
Since the expected dividend payment time is finite (1/r), for simplicity we normalize the
discount rate to be zero (i.e., there is no time discounting). Allowing a positive time discounting
does not change our qualitative results. Moreover, in the supplemental material to this paper,
we provide an extension in which infinitely many dividends are paid sequentially and there is
a time discount. The main results of this paper are robust to this extension.
Information and preference. At news time Tk, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, each trader i receives a
private signal Si,Tk about the dividend shock:
Si,Tk = DTk −DTk−1 + i,Tk , where i,Tk ∼ N (0, σ2 ) are i.i.d., (5)
and where DT−1 ≡ 0. The private signals of trader i are never disclosed to anyone else. If
signals about dividend shocks were perfect, i.e. σ2 = 0, the information structure of our model
would be similar to that of Vayanos (1999).
In addition, beyond the common valueDT , each trader i has a private value wi,T for receiving
the dividend. The private values may reflect tax or risk-management considerations. The
private values are also shocked at the news times {Tk}k≥0, and each private-value shock is i.i.d.
normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ2w:
wi,Tk − wi,Tk−1 ∼ N (0, σ2w), (6)
where wi,T−1 ≡ 0. Written in continuous time, trader i’s private-value process wi,τ is a jump
process:
wi,τ = wi,Tk , if Tk ≤ τ < Tk+1. (7)
The private values to trader i are observed by himself and are never disclosed to anyone else.
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Therefore, if the dividend is paid at time τ , trader i receives
vi,τ ≡ Dτ + wi,τ (8)
per unit of asset held.4
The bottom plot of Figure 1 illustrates the news times {Tk}k≥0, when dividend shocks, the
signals of dividend shocks, and the private-value shocks all arrive. The two plots of Figure 1
make it clear that, in our model, the fundamental properties of the asset are separate from the
trading frequency of the market.
Moreover, in an interval [t∆, (t+ 1)∆) but before the dividend D is paid, trader i incurs a
“flow cost” that is equal to 0.5λz2i,(t+1)∆ per unit of clock time, where λ > 0 is a commonly known
constant. The quadratic flow cost is essentially a dynamic version of the quadratic cost used
in the static models of Vives (2011) and Rostek and Weretka (2012). We can also interpret
this flow cost as an inventory cost, which can come from regulatory capital requirements,
collateral requirement, or risk-management considerations. (This inventory cost is not strictly
risk aversion, however.) Once the dividend is paid, the flow cost no longer applies. Thus,
conditional on the dividend having not been paid by time t∆, each trader suffers the flow cost
for a duration of min(∆, T − t∆) within period t, with the expectation
E[min(∆, T − t∆) | T > t∆] =
∫ ∞
0
re−rτ min(τ,∆) dτ =
1− e−r∆
r
, (9)
where we have used the fact that, given the memoryless property of exponential distribution,
T − t∆ is exponentially distributed with mean 1/r conditional on T > t∆.
Value function and equilibrium definition. For conciseness of expressions, we let Hi,τ be
the “history” (information set) of trader i at time τ :
Hi,τ =
{
{(Si,Tl , wi,Tl)}Tl≤τ , {zi,t′∆}t′∆≤τ , {xi,t′∆(p)}t′∆<τ
}
. (10)
That is, Hi,τ contains trader i’s asset value-relevant information received up to time τ , trader
i’s path of inventories up to time τ , and trader i’s demand schedules in double auctions before
time τ . Notice that by the identity zi,(t′+1)∆ − zi,t′∆ = xi,t′∆(p∗t′∆), a trader can infer from Hi,τ
the price in any past period t′. Notice also that Hi,t∆ does not include the outcome of the
period-t double auction.
Let Vi,t∆ be trader i’s period-t continuation value immediately before the double auction at
time t∆. By the definition of Hi,τ , trader i’s information set right before the period-t double
4As in Wang (1994), the unconditional mean of the dividend here is zero, but one could add a positive
constant to D so that the probability of D < 0 or vi < 0 is arbitrarily small. Moreover, in the markets for many
financial and commodity derivatives—including forwards, futures and swaps—cash flows can become arbitrarily
negative as market conditions change over time.
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auction is Hi,t∆. We can write Vi,t∆ recursively as:
Vi,t∆ = E
[
− x∗i,t∆p∗t∆ + (1− e−r∆)(zi,t∆ + x∗i,t∆)vi,t∆ + e−r∆Vi,(t+1)∆
− 1− e
−r∆
r
· λ
2
(zi,t∆ + x
∗
i,t∆)
2
∣∣∣∣∣Hi,t∆
]
, (11)
where x∗i,t∆ is a shorthand for xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆). The first term −x∗i,t∆p∗t∆ is trader i’s net cash flow for
buying x∗i,t∆ units at p
∗
t∆ each. The second term (1 − e−r∆)(zi,t∆ + x∗i,t∆)vi,t∆ says that if the
dividend is paid during period t, which happens with probability 1−e−r∆, then trader i receives
(zi,t∆ +x
∗
i,t∆)vi,t∆ in expectation. (Since shocks to the common dividend and private values have
mean zero, trader i’s expected value is still vi,t∆ even if multiple pieces of news arrive during
period t.) The third term e−r∆Vi,(t+1)∆ says that if the dividend is not paid during period
t, which happens with probability e−r∆, trader i receives the next-period continuation value
Vi,(t+1)∆. Finally, the last term −1−e−r∆r · λ2 (zi,t∆ + x∗i,t∆)2 is the expected quadratic inventory
cost incurred during period t for holding zi,t∆ + x
∗
i,t∆ units of the asset (see Equation (9)).
We can expand the recursive definition of Vi,t∆ explicitly:
Vi,t∆ = E
[
−
∞∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)∆x∗i,t′∆p
∗
t′∆ +
∞∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)∆(1− e−r∆)vi,t′∆(zi,t′∆ + x∗i,t′∆)
− 1− e
−r∆
r
∞∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)∆λ
2
(zi,t′∆ + x
∗
i,t′∆)
2
∣∣∣∣∣Hi,t∆
]
. (12)
While trader i’s continuation value Vi,t∆ can in principle depend on everything in his in-
formation set Hi,t∆, in the equilibrium we characterize, Vi,t∆ depends on trader i’s current
pre-auction inventory zi,t∆, his current private value wi,t∆, and the sum of his private signals∑
l:Tl≤t∆ Si,Tl about the dividend.
Definition 1 (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a strategy
profile {xi,t∆}1≤i≤n,t≥0, where each xi,t∆ depends only on Hi,t∆, such that for every trader i and
at every path of his information set Hi,t∆, trader i has no incentive to deviate from {xi,t′∆}t′≥t.
That is, for every alternative strategy {x˜i,t′∆}t′≥t, we have:
Vi,t∆({xi,t′∆}t′≥t, {xj,t′∆}j 6=i,t′≥t) ≥ Vi,t∆({x˜i,t′∆}t′≥t, {xj,t′∆}j 6=i,t′≥t). (13)
2.2 The competitive benchmark equilibrium
Before solving this model with imperfect competition and strategic trading, we first solve a
competitive benchmark in which all traders take prices as given. In doing so, we will also solve
the traders’ inference of the dividend D from equilibrium prices. The solution to this inference
problem in the competitive equilibrium will be used directly in solving the strategic equilibrium
later.
For clarity, we use the superscript “c” to label the strategies, allocations, and prices in the
competitive equilibrium. In each period t each trader i maximizes his continuation value Vi,t∆,
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defined in Equation (12), by choosing the optimal demand schedule xci,t∆(p
c
t∆), taking as given
the period-t price and the strategies of his own and other traders in subsequent periods.
We start by conjecturing that the competitive demand schedule xci,t∆(p
c
t∆) in period t is such
that trader i’s expected marginal value for holding zci,t∆ + x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆) units of the asset for the
indefinite future is equal to the price pct∆, for every p
c
t∆. That is, we conjecture that
E [vi,t∆ | Hi,t∆, pct∆]−
λ
r
(zci,t∆ + x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆)) = p
c
t∆, (14)
where the term λ/r takes into account that the marginal holding cost is incurred for an expected
duration of time 1/r. This conjecture can be rewritten as:
xci,t∆(p
c
t∆) =− zci,t∆ +
r
λ
(E [vi,t∆ | Hi,t∆, pct∆]− pct∆) . (15)
The bulk of the remaining derivation involves finding an explicit expression for E[vi,t∆ |
Hi,t∆, p
c
t∆]. After that the optimal strategy is derived and verified.
Without loss of generality, let us focus on the period-t double auction and suppose that the
latest dividend shock is the k-th. Conditional on the unbiased signals {Sj,Tl}0≤l≤k of dividend
shocks, trader j’s expected value of the dividend Dt∆ is a multiple of
∑k
l=0 Sj,Tl . Moreover, his
private value, wj,Tk , is perfectly observable to him. We thus conjecture that each trader j uses
the following symmetric linear strategy:
xcj,t∆(p) = A1
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + A2wj,Tk −
r
λ
p− zcj,t∆ + fZ, (16)
where A1, A2, and f are constants and where we have plugged in the coefficients of p and
zj,t∆ from Equation (15). In particular, trader j puts a weight of A1 on his common-value
information and a weight of A2 on his private value.
By market clearing and the fact that
∑
j zj,t∆ = Z is common knowledge, each trader i is
able to infer ∑
j 6=i
(
A1
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tk + A2wj,Tk
)
(17)
from the equilibrium price pct∆. Thus, each trader i infers his value vi,Tk ≡ DTk +wi,Tk by taking
9
the conditional expectation:
E
[
vi,Tk
∣∣∣∣∣Hi,Tk ,∑
j 6=i
(
A1
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + A2wj,Tk
)]
=wi,Tk + E
[
DTk
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
l=0
Si,Tl ,
∑
j 6=i
(
A1
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + A2wj,Tk
)]
=wi,Tk +B1
k∑
l=0
Si,Tl +B2
∑
j 6=i
(
A1
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + A2wj,Tk
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inferred from pct∆
, (18)
where we have used the projection theorem for normal distribution and where the constants
B1 and B2 are functions of A1, A2, and other primitive parameters. In particular, trader i’s
conditional expected value has a weight of B1 on his common-value information
∑k
l=0 Si,Tl and
a weight of 1 on his private value wi,Tk . The third term is inferred from the price.
Because trader i’s competitive strategy xci,t∆ is linear in E[vi,Tk | p∗t∆, Hi,Tk ], trader i’s weight
on his common-value information and his weight on the private value have a ratio of B1. But
by symmetric strategies, this ratio must be consistent with the conjectured strategy to start
with, i.e., B1 = A1/A2. In Appendix C.1, we explicitly calculate that this symmetry pins down
the ratio to be B1 = A1/A2 ≡ χ, where χ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique solution to5
1/(χ2σ2 )
1/(χ2σ2D) + 1/(χ
2σ2 ) + (n− 1)/(χ2σ2 + σ2w)
= χ. (19)
On the left-hand side of Equation (19), we apply the projection theorem to Equation (18) to
derive the weight B1 as a function of A1/A2 ≡ χ. The projection theorem weighs the precision
of the noise χi,Tk in trader i’s dividend signal, against the precision of the dividend shock
χ(DTk−DTk−1) and the precision of others’ dividend noise and private value
∑
j 6=i(χj,Tk+wj,Tk).
We define the “total signal” si,t∆ by
si,Tk ≡
χ
α
k∑
l=0
Si,Tl +
1
α
wi,Tk , (20)
si,τ = si,Tk , for τ ∈ [Tk, Tk+1),
where the scaling factor α is defined to be
α ≡ χ
2σ2 + σ
2
w
nχ2σ2 + σ
2
w
>
1
n
. (21)
Trader i’s total signal incorporates the two-dimensional information (
∑k
l=0 Si,Tl , wi,Tk) in a linear
5The left-hand side of Equation (19) is decreasing in χ. It is 1/(1 + σ2 /σ
2
D) > 0 if χ = 0 and is 1/(1 +
σ2 /σ
2
D+(n−1)/(1+σ2w/σ2 )) < 1 if χ = 1. Hence, Equation (19) has a unique solution χ ∈ R, and such solution
satisfies χ ∈ (0, 1).
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combination with weights χ/α and 1/α.
This construction of total signals leads to a very intuitive expression of the conditional
expected value vi,Tk . Direct calculation implies that (see details in Appendix C.1, Lemma 1)
E
[
vi,Tk
∣∣∣Hi,Tk ,∑j 6=i sj,Tk] = αsi,Tk + 1− αn− 1 ∑j 6=i sj,Tk︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inferred from pct∆
. (22)
Equation (22) says that conditional on his own information and
∑
j 6=i sj,Tk (inferred from the
equilibrium price), trader i’s expected value of the asset is a weighted average of the total signals,
with a weight of α > 1/n on his own total signal si,Tk and a weight of (1 − α)/(n − 1) < 1/n
on each of the other traders’ total signal sj,Tk . The weights differ because other traders’ total
signals include both common dividend information and their private values, and others’ private
values are essentially “noise” to trader i (hence under-weighting).
Substituting the conditional expected value of Equation (22) into Equation (15), we have
xci,t∆(p
c
t∆) =− zci,t∆ +
r
λ
(
αsi,t∆ +
1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
)
− r
λ
pct∆, (23)
By market clearing,
∑
i x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆) = 0, we solve
pct∆ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
sj,t∆ − λ
rn
Z. (24)
The first term of pct∆ is the average total signal, and the second term is the marginal cost of
holding the average inventory Z/n for an expected duration of time 1/r.
Substituting
∑
j 6=i sj,t∆ from Equation (24) back to the expression of x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆) in Equation
(23), we obtain explicitly the competitive demand schedule:
xci,t∆(p) =
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
(
si,t∆ − p− λ(n− 1)
r(nα− 1)z
c
i,t∆ +
λ(1− α)
r(nα− 1)Z
)
. (25)
Appendix C.2 verifies that under this strategy the first-order condition of trader i’s value
function (12) can indeed be written in the form of Equation (15). The second-order condition
is satisfied as nα > 1 by the definition of α.
The after-auction allocation in the competitive equilibrium in period t is:
zci,(t+1)∆ = z
c
i,t∆ + x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆) =
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
(
si,t∆ − 1
n
n∑
j=1
sj,t∆
)
+
1
n
Z. (26)
That is, after each double auction, each trader is allocated the average inventory plus a constant
multiple of how far his total signal deviates from the average total signal. The key feature of
the competitive equilibrium is that the after-auction inventory does not depend on the pre-
auction inventory. This is because the pre-auction inventory enters the demand schedule with
the coefficient −1 (see Equation (25)). As we will see in the next subsection, this property of
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the competitive equilibrium will not hold in the strategic equilibrium. We also see that the
competitive inventories are martingales since total signals are martingales. We refer to this
allocation as the “competitive allocation.”
The following proposition summarizes the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the competitive equilibrium, the strategies are given by Equation (25), the
price by Equation (24), and the allocations by Equation (26).
2.3 Characterizing the strategic equilibrium
Having solved a competitive benchmark, we now turn to the equilibrium with imperfect com-
petition and strategic behavior, i.e., traders take into account the impact of their trades on
prices. The equilibrium is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that nα > 2, which is equivalent to
1
n/2 + σ2/σ
2
D
<
√
n− 2
n
σw
σ
. (27)
With strategic trading, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which every trader i submits
the demand schedule
xi,t∆(p; si,t∆, zi,t∆) = b
(
si,t∆ − p− λ(n− 1)
r(nα− 1)zi,t∆ +
λ(1− α)
r(nα− 1)Z
)
, (28)
where
b =
(nα− 1)r
2(n− 1)e−r∆λ
(
(nα− 1)(1− e−r∆) + 2e−r∆ −
√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆
)
> 0.
(29)
The period-t equilibrium price is
p∗t∆ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
si,t∆ − λ
rn
Z. (30)
The derivation of the strategic equilibrium follows similar steps to that of the competitive
equilibrium derived in Section 2.2. The details of equilibrium construction are delegated to
Appendix C.3. Below, we discuss the key intuition of the strategic equilibrium by comparing
it with the competitive one.
Let us start with common properties shared between the strategic equilibrium and the
competitive one. For example, both equilibria have the same price. Because prices are equal,
inference from prices is the same across both equilibria; hence, the total signals {si,t∆} that
consolidate traders’ information about the common dividend and private values are constructed
in the same way. The price aggregates the most recent total signals {si,t∆}. Since the total
signals are martingales, the equilibrium prices over time also form a martingale.
The second term −λZ/(nr) in p∗t∆ and pct∆ is the expected marginal cost of holding the
average inventory Z/n until the dividend is paid, i.e., for an expected duration of time 1/r.
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Although each trader learns from p∗t∆ the average total signal
∑
i si,t∆/n in period t, he does not
learn the total signal or inventory of any other individual trader. Nor does a trader perfectly
distinguish between the common-value component and the private-value component of the
price. Thus, private information is not fully revealed after each round of trading. Finally,
the equilibrium strategies in Equations (28) and (25) are stationary: a trader’s strategy only
depends on his most recent total signal si,t∆ and his current inventory zi,t∆, but does not depend
explicitly on t.6
There are two important differences between the strategic equilibrium of Proposition 2 and
the competitive benchmark in Section 2.2. First, in the strategic equilibrium, rather than
taking the price as given, each trader in each period effectively selects a price-quantity pair
from the residual demand schedule of all other traders. To mitigate price impact, they trade
less aggressively in the strategic equilibrium than in the competitive equilibrium. Formally, the
endogenous coefficient b in Equation (28) is strictly smaller than r(nα−1)
λ(n−1) in Equation (25):
b
r(nα−1)
λ(n−1)
= 1 +
(nα− 1)(1− e−r∆)−√(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆
2e−r∆
< 1. (31)
This feature is the familiar “bid shading” or “demand reduction” in models of divisible auction
(see Ausubel, Cramton, Pycia, Rostek, and Weretka 2014). The coefficient b captures how
much additional quantity of the asset a trader is willing to buy if the price drops by one unit
per period. Thus, a smaller b corresponds to a less aggressive demand schedule. As the number
n of traders tends to infinity, the ratio in Equation (31) tends to 1, so the strategic equilibrium
converges to the competitive equilibrium.
Intimately related to the aggressiveness of demand schedules is the extent to which a trader
“liquidates” his inventory in each trading round. In the competitive equilibrium strategy xci,t∆,
the coefficient in front of zci,t∆ is −1, meaning that each trader liquidates his inventory entirely.
By contrast, under the strategy xi,t∆ of Proposition 2, the coefficient in front of zi,t∆ is
d ≡ −b λ(n− 1)
r(nα− 1) = −1 +
√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆ − (nα− 1)(1− e−r∆)
2e−r∆
, (32)
which, under the condition nα > 2, is strictly between −1 and 0. Thus, each trader only
liquidates a fraction |d| < 1 of his inventory, leaving a fraction 1+d ∈ (0, 1). Partial liquidation
of inventory implies that the strategy in period t has an impact on strategies in all future periods,
and that an inefficient allocation in one period affects the inefficiency in all future periods. The
6Some readers may wonder why our model does not have the infinite-regress problem of beliefs about beliefs,
beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, etc. The reason is that the equilibrium price reveals the average total signal
in each period; thus, a trader’s belief about the common dividend, as well as his potential high-order beliefs, is
actually spanned by this trader’s own private information and the equilibrium price. This logic was previously
used by He and Wang (1995) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) to show that the potential infinite-regress
problem is resolved in their dynamic models with heterogenous information. Our assumption that the common
dividend and private values evolve as random walks implies that only the current price has the most updated
information and hence allows us to characterize a linear equilibrium with stationary strategies. We note that the
random walk assumption is probably stronger than necessary to obtain tractability. For example, if everyone’s
dividend signals and private values decay to zero at a same constant rate, then the model is expected to remain
tractable; we thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this possibility with decay.
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next subsection investigates in details how the quantity 1 + d determines allocative inefficiency,
which is ultimately related to the optimal trading frequency that we study in Section 3.
Relative to the competitive benchmark, the second important difference of the strategic
equilibrium is that its existence requires nα > 2. If and only if nα > 2 is the coefficient b
positive, i.e., demand is decreasing in price.7 Intuitively, if a trader observes a higher equilibrium
price, he infers that other traders have either higher private values or more favorable information
about the common dividend. If the trader attributes too much of the higher price to a higher
dividend, he may end up buying more conditional on a higher price, which leads to a negative b
and violates the second order condition. Learning from prices does not cause such a problem in
the competitive equilibrium because a higher price there also reflects traders’ disregard of price
impact. Thus, conditional on the same price, traders do not learn as much about the dividend
in the competitive equilibrium as in the strategic one.
The condition nα > 2 requires that adverse selection regarding the common dividend is
not “too large” relative to the gains from trade over private values. We can show that it is
equivalent to condition (27), written in primitive parameters. All else equal, condition (27)
holds if n is sufficiently large, if signals of dividend shocks are sufficiently precise (i.e., σ2 is
small enough), if new information on the common dividend is not too volatile (i.e., σ2D is small
enough), or if shocks to private values are sufficiently volatile (i.e., σ2w is large enough). All
these conditions reduce adverse selection.
In particular, the condition nα > 2 is trivially satisfied if α = 1, which applies if dividend
information is public (σ2 = 0 and σ
2
w > 0) or if traders have pure private values (σ
2
D = 0 and
σ2w > 0). Securities with public dividend information correspond to high-quality government
bonds like those issued by the United States, Germany, Japan, or the United Kingdom. Secu-
rities that are riskier but have low degrees of adverse selection also have an α close to 1. For
instance, a broad equity market index like the S&P 500 probably has a very low signal-to-noise
ratio σ2D/σ
2
 , since very few asset managers can consistently beat the overall stock market. Let-
ting σ2D/σ
2
w → 0 in Equation (19), we get χ→ 0 and hence α→ 1. By contrast, an individual
stock’s α is likely smaller because adverse selection at the single stock level is generally more
severe than at the index level. These observations are consistent with the fact that trading large
stock indices incurs lower bid-ask spreads than trading single stocks, especially small stocks.8
We close this subsection with a brief discussion of equilibrium uniqueness. Since news times
and trading times are separate in our model, it could happen that no new information arrives
during one or more periods. For example, if no new information arrives in the time interval
((t− 1)∆, t∆], then the period-t double auction will have the same price as the period-(t− 1)
double auction, i.e., the period-t double auction looks like a public-information game. Vayanos
(1999) shows that public-information games admit a continuum of equilibria, and he uses a
trembling-hand argument to select one of them.
7The existence condition for our equilibrium is analogous to Kyle, Obizhaeva, and Wang (2014)’s equilibrium
existence condition that each trader believes that his signal about the asset value is roughly at least twice as
precise as others traders believe it to be.
8For instance, SPDR reports that the average bid-ask spread for the SPY, the SPDR ETF for the
S&P 500 index, is on average 1 cent, or below 1 basis point of the price level (100 basis points is
1%). See https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/general-investing/why-spy-size-liquidity-and-low-cost-of-
ownership.pdf. In contrast, Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) report that the relative bid-ask spreads
of large, medium, and small U.S. stocks are 4.7, 14.6 and 38.1 basis points, respectively.
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Our approach to equilibrium selection is to impose stationarity, i.e., the coefficients in the
linear strategy are the same across all periods. Going back to the example, if no new information
arrives in ((t − 1)∆, t∆], the stationarity-selected equilibrium in the period-t double auction
will be identical to one in which fresh news does arrive in ((t− 1)∆, t∆] but the realizations of
the dividend shock, the n signals of dividend shocks, and the n private-value shocks all turn out
to be zero.9 The following proposition shows that the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is unique if
strategies are restricted to be linear and stationary.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium from Proposition 2 is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in the following class of strategies:
xi,t∆(p) =
∑
Tl≤t∆
alSi,Tl + awwi,t∆ − bp+ dzi,t∆ + f, (33)
where {al}l≥0, aw, b, d and f are constants.
As the proof of Proposition 2 makes clear, each trader’s optimal strategy belongs to class (33)
if other traders also use strategy from class (33). Therefore, Equation (33) is not a restriction
on the traders’ strategy space, but rather a restriction on the domain of equilibrium uniqueness.
(We have not ruled out the existence of non-linear equilibria.)
2.4 Efficiency and comparative statics
We now study the allocative efficiency (or inefficiency) in the equilibrium of Proposition 2. The
results of this section lay the foundation for the study of optimal trading frequency in the next
section.
We denote by {z∗i,τ} the continuous-time inventory path obtained in the strategic equilibrium
of Proposition 2, and denote by {zci,τ} the continuous-time inventory path obtained in the
competitive equilibrium of Proposition 1. For any clock-time τ ∈ (t∆, (t + 1)∆], they are
defined by:
z∗i,τ = z
∗
i,(t+1)∆ = z
∗
i,t∆ + xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆; si,t∆, z
∗
i,t∆), (34)
zci,τ = z
c
i,(t+1)∆ = z
c
i,t∆ + x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆; si,t∆, z
c
i,t∆). (35)
Figure 2 shows a sample path of z∗i,τ and z
c
i,τ . Again, z
∗
i,(t+1)∆ and z
c
i,(t+1)∆ are the inventories
of trader i in the time interval (t∆, (t+ 1)∆) in the two equilibria.
9We note that the continuation value Vi,t∆ (cf. Equation (12)) is a stationary function of the total signal si,t∆
and inventory zi,t∆, whether or not there is new information in ((t−1)∆, t∆]. This stationarity is different from
that in Rostek and Weretka (2015) because in our model traders get discounted flow utility as they trade, while
in Rostek and Weretka (2015) traders get utility at the end of trading rounds (between consecutive dividend
shocks).
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Figure 2: Illustration of z∗i,τ and z
c
i,τ .
↑
zi,tΔc
↑zi,(t+1)Δc
↑zi,tΔ*
↑zi,(t+1)Δ*
(t - 1)Δ t Δ (t + 1)Δτ
zi,τc
zi,τ*
The inventories {z∗i,t∆} obtained by the strategic equilibrium evolve according to:
z∗i,(t+1)∆ = z
∗
i,t∆ + xi,t∆(p
∗
t∆; si,t∆, z
∗
i,t∆)
= (1 + d)z∗i,t∆ + b
(
si,t∆ − 1
n
∑
j
sj,t∆ +
λ(n− 1)
r(nα− 1)
Z
n
)
= b
(
si,t∆ − 1
n
∑
j
sj,t∆
)
+
1
n
Z + (1 + d)
(
z∗i,t∆ −
1
n
Z
)
(36)
= (1 + d)z∗i,t∆ − dzci,(t+1)∆,
where in the second line we have substituted in the equilibrium strategy xi,t∆ and the equilibrium
price p∗t∆, the third line follows from the identity of d/b = − λ(n−1)r(nα−1) in the equilibrium strategy,
and in the last line we have substituted in the competitive allocation of Equation (26).
Comparing Equation (36) to Equation (26), we can see two differences. First, the after-
auction allocation in the strategic equilibrium has an extra term (1 + d)(z∗i,t∆ − Z/n). Since
1+d ∈ (0, 1), any inventory imbalance at the beginning of period t partly carries over to the next
period. As discussed in the previous subsection, this is a direct consequence of demand reduction
caused by strategic trading. Second, because inventories cannot be liquidated quickly due to
strategic bidding, traders are more reluctant to acquire inventory. Therefore, the coefficient in
front of si,t∆−
∑
j sj,t∆/n in the strategic allocation (36) is smaller than that in the competitive
allocation (26). That is, strategic bidding makes after-auction asset allocations less sensitive to
the dispersion of information (as measured by the total signals).
The above derivation directly leads to the exponential convergence to the competitive allo-
cation over time, shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that for some 0 ≤ t ≤ t, si,t∆ = si,t∆ for every i and every t ∈
{t, t+ 1, . . . , t}. Then, for every i, the equilibrium inventories z∗i,t∆ satisfy:
z∗i,(t+1)∆ − zci,(t+1)∆ = (1 + d)t+1−t(z∗i,t∆ − zci,(t+1)∆), ∀t ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , t}, (37)
16
where d ∈ (−1, 0) is given by Equation (32).
Moreover, 1 + d is decreasing in n, r, and σ2w, but increasing in σ
2
D. As ∆ increases, 1 + d
decreases, and the time-discounted geometric sum
L ≡ (1− e−r∆)
∞∑
t=0
e−r∆t(1 + d)2(t+1) =
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)2
1− e−r∆(1 + d)2 , (38)
decreases as well.
Equation (37) says that the after-auction allocation z∗i,(t+1)∆, t ≤ t ≤ t, converges exponen-
tially to zci,(t+1)∆, which is the competitive allocation given the set of total signals {si,t∆}ni=1.
(Recall that zci,(t+1)∆ denotes the competitive allocation right before the double auction at time
(t + 1)∆, hence the time subscript t + 1 instead of t.) In addition, the competitive allocation
does not change from the clock time t∆ to the clock time t∆ because the total signals do not
change during this time interval. If t = t = t, Equation (37) is equivalent to Equation (36).
The case of t < t follows by mathematical induction.
Proposition 4 reveals that the strategic equilibrium is inefficient in allocating assets, al-
though the allocative inefficiency converges to zero exponentially over time (as long as no
new information arrives). After new dividend shocks and private-value shocks, the competi-
tive allocation changes accordingly, and the strategic allocation starts to converge toward the
new competitive allocation exponentially. Exponential convergence of this kind is previously
obtained in the dynamic model of Vayanos (1999) under the assumption that common-value
information is public.
The comparative statics of 1+d with respect to n, r, σ2w, and σ
2
D are all intuitive. A smaller
1 + d means a faster convergence to efficiency. A larger n makes traders more competitive, and
a larger r makes them more impatient. Both effects encourage aggressive bidding and speed up
convergence. A large σ2D implies a large uncertainty of a trader about the common asset value
and a severe adverse selection; hence, in equilibrium the trader reduces his demand or supply
relative to the fully competitive market. Therefore, a higher σ2D implies less aggressive bidding
and slower convergence to the competitive allocation. The effect of σ2w is the opposite: a higher
σ2w implies larger gains from trade, and hence more aggressive bidding and faster convergence to
the competitive allocation.10 The effects of n, σ2D and σ
2
w on bidding aggressiveness are present
in the earlier static models of Vives (2011) and Rostek and Weretka (2012). The effect of σ2D
in reducing the convergence speed to efficiency is also confirmed by Sannikov and Skrzypacz
(2014) in a continuous-time trading model.
The comparative statics with respect to ∆ are more novel and subtle. First, 1 +d is smaller
if ∆ is larger, that is, the convergence per period is faster if the trading frequency is lower.
Intuitively, if traders have more subsequent opportunities to trade, say once every second, they
are less willing to suffer any price impact now. Hence, their demand schedules are less aggressive
in each period.
The time-discounted sum L, as defined in Equation (38), has an intuitive interpretation. It
10The comparative static of 1 + d with respect to σ2 is ambiguous. It can be shown that the endogenous pa-
rameters α and χ, and hence the speed of convergence, depend on the “normalized variances” σ2D/σ
2
 and σ
2
w/σ
2
 .
As σ2 increases, σ
2
D/σ
2
 and σ
2
w/σ
2
 both decrease. A decrease in σ
2
D/σ
2
 increases the speed of convergence,
while a decrease in σ2w/σ
2
 decreases the speed of convergence. The net effect is ambiguous.
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is proportional to the expected total inventory cost conditional on no change of the competitive
allocation. To see the intuition, suppose for simplicity that: (i) the only piece of news is the
one arriving at time 0 before the very first double auction; (ii) Z = 0; and (iii) {si,0} are the
same across i, so the competitive allocation given the time-0 signals is Z/n = 0 for all traders.
In this case, trader i’s expected inventory cost from time 0 to time ∆ is 1−e
−r∆
r
λ
2
(1 + d)2z2i,0, his
expected inventory cost from time ∆ to time 2∆ is e−r∆ 1−e
−r∆
r
λ
2
(1 + d)4z2i,0, ..., his expected
inventory cost from time t∆ to (t + 1)∆ is e−rt∆ 1−e
−rt∆
r
λ
2
(1 + d)2(t+1)z2i,0, ..., and so on. Here,
we have used the exponential convergence of inventory shown in Proposition 4, and the time-
discount e−rt∆ is the probability that the liquidating dividend is not yet paid by time t∆ and
hence holding costs are incurred afterwards. Summing up these terms, we see that each trader
i’s total expected inventory hold cost is proportional to L:
λ
2r
z2i,0
[
(1− e−r∆)
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆(1 + d)2(t+1)
]
=
λ
2r
z2i,0 · L. (39)
Proposition 4 states that L is smaller if ∆ is larger, i.e., if the trading frequency is lower.
Intuitively, a lower trading frequency reduces 1+d, hence “front-loading” the asset reallocation
among traders toward earlier periods while reducing the expected asset reallocation in later
periods.11 But because of the time discounting e−rt∆, early-period allocative efficiency is more
important than later-period allocative efficiency. Thus, L is decreasing in ∆. Indeed, Equation
(32) implies that
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)
1− e−r∆(1 + d)2 =
1
nα− 1 , (40)
and hence
L =
1 + d
nα− 1 , (41)
which is decreasing in ∆ because 1 + d is decreasing in ∆.
We emphasize that the relation between L and the expected inventory cost holds only if
the competitive allocation does not change between trading periods (this is why each term
involves the same z2i,0 in the derivation above). Whether the competitive allocation changes
between auctions depends critically on whether or not the times of new information arrivals are
predictable. For this reason, scheduled versus stochastic news arrivals have drastically different
implications on how trading frequency affects welfare, as we show in the next section.
11To see this, note that, in this example, trader i’s trading volume in double auction t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}, conditional
on the liquidating dividend not being realized up to time t∆, is equal to |zi,0|
(
(1 + d)t − (1 + d)t+1) = |zi,0|(1+
d)t(−d). For any ∆ ∈ [0,∞), these trading volumes sum up or integrate to |zi,0| over t. It is easy to verify that
for t < 1+d−d , a smaller 1 + d, equivalently a larger −d > 0, leads to a larger (1 + d)t(−d). Thus, a smaller 1 + d
pushes trading volumes toward earlier periods and away from later periods, even conditional on the liquidating
dividend having not realized. The possible realization of the liquidating dividend further reduces the expected
later-period trading volume (i.e., asset reallocation) because of the discounting e−rt∆.
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3 Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency
In this section, we use the model framework developed in Section 2 to analyze the welfare
implications of trading frequency. Throughout this section we conduct the analysis based
on the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Proposition 2, which requires the parameter condition
nα > 2.
3.1 Welfare definition and notations
We define the equilibrium welfare as the sum of the ex-ante expected utilities over all traders:
W (∆) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(1− e−r∆)
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆
(
vi,t∆z
∗
i,(t+1)∆ −
λ
2r
(z∗i,(t+1)∆)
2
)]
, (42)
where {z∗i,t∆} is the inventory path in the equilibrium of Proposition 2, defined by Equation
(36). As usual, the price terms are canceled out as they are transfers. We denote the ∆ that
maximizes W (∆) as ∆∗.
Analogously, we can define the welfare in the competitive equilibrium of Section 2.2 as:
W c(∆) = E
[
n∑
i=1
(1− e−r∆)
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆
(
vi,t∆z
c
i,(t+1)∆ −
λ
2r
(zci,(t+1)∆)
2
)]
. (43)
Although the competitive equilibrium is more efficient than the strategic one, it is still not
fully efficient because new information may arrive between two double auctions. To explicitly
take into account the possible misalignment between trading times and information arrival
times, we use the following allocation as a benchmark:
zei,τ ≡
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
(
si,τ − 1
n
n∑
j=1
sj,τ
)
+
1
n
Z, for every τ ≥ 0. (44)
The allocation zei,τ is obtained in an idealized world in which a competitive double auction is
held immediately after each news arrival. For this reason, we will refer to zei,τ as the “competi-
tive allocation without delay” or “zero-delay competitive allocation.” If there were no adverse
selection (asymmetric information about the common dividend), then zei,τ would be the fully
efficient allocation and would be a good benchmark. With adverse selection, however, zei,τ is
not the fully efficient allocation because the dispersion in {zei,τ} across traders reflects their
different private signals about the common dividend. If those signals about the common value
were public, the dispersion in traders’ fully efficient allocations would only reflect their different
private values. Of course, this source of inefficiency in zei,τ is only a consequence of the informa-
tion structure but not the trading process, so in our analysis of the optimal trading frequency,
zei,τ is still a reasonable benchmark. The superscript “e” in z
e
i,τ indicates that the allocation
{zei,τ} is more efficient than {z∗i,t∆} and {zci,t∆} (see Lemma 2 in Section C.6), both of which
involve potentially delayed response to new information.
Figure 3 illustrates a possible sample path of z∗i,τ , z
c
i,τ , and z
e
i,τ . In this example, a piece
of new information arrives strictly between period-(t − 1) and period-t double auctions. We
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Figure 3: Illustration of z∗i,τ , z
c
i,τ , and z
e
i,τ .
Information Arrival↓
↑
zi,tΔc
↑zi,(t+1)Δc
↑zi,tΔ*
↑zi,(t+1)Δ*
(t - 1)Δ t Δ (t + 1)Δτ
zi,τe
zi,τc
zi,τ*
see that zei,τ responds immediately to the new information, but z
∗
i,τ and z
c
i,τ only change at the
next trading opportunity. The gap between z∗i,τ and z
c
i,τ represents the inefficiency caused by
strategic behavior, and the gap between zci,τ and z
e
i,τ represents the inefficiency caused by the
misalignment between trading times and news times.
The ex-ante welfare under the competitive allocation without delay is:
W e = E
[
n∑
i=1
∫ ∞
τ=0
re−rτ
(
vi,τz
e
i,τ −
λ
2r
(zei,τ )
2
)
dτ
]
, (45)
which is independent of ∆. Again, W e would be the maximum possible welfare without adverse
selection.
Because W e is invariant to ∆, it is without loss of generality to use W e as a benchmark in
assessing the impact of trading frequency on welfare. We can thus define the following metric
of the allocative inefficiency in the strategic equilibrium of Proposition 2:
X(∆) ≡ W e −W (∆) = [W c(∆)−W (∆)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
X1(∆), welfare cost of strategic behavior
+ [W e −W c(∆)].︸ ︷︷ ︸
X2(∆), welfare cost of trading delay
(46)
The first part of the above decomposition, call it X1(∆), is due to strategic behavior and demand
reduction. The second part, call it X2(∆), is due to the potential misalignment between trading
times and news times. This decomposition highlights the important tradeoff in increasing
trading frequency:
• A smaller ∆ allows investors to react quickly to new information, reducing X2(∆).
• A smaller ∆ also reduces the aggressiveness of demand schedules in each double auction,
increasing X1(∆). This channel is a consequence of the fact that L decreases in ∆ (see
Proposition 4).
This tradeoff is a fundamental determinant of the optimal trading frequency, as we explain in
the rest of this section.
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Finally, we define:
σ2z ≡
n∑
i=1
E[(zei,Tk − zei,Tk−1)2] =
(
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
)2
(n− 1)(χ2(σ2D + σ2 ) + σ2w)
α2
> 0, (47)
σ20 ≡
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2] =
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zci,∆)2]. (48)
The first variance σ2z describes the extent to which each arrival of new information changes
the competitive allocation without delay. The second variance σ20 describes the distance between
the ex-ante inventory and the competitive zero-delay allocation given the new information that
arrives at time 0. If zi,0 = Z/n for every trader i (all traders are ex-ante identical), then
σ20 = σ
2
z .
12 One may naturally view “time 0” as a reduced-form representation of a steady
state, in which case σ20 and σ
2
z should be equal. In the results below we will keep σ
2
0 as a generic
parameter but highlight results for the most natural case of σ20 = σ
2
z .
3.2 Scheduled arrivals of new information
We first consider scheduled information arrivals. In particular, we suppose that shocks to the
common dividend and shocks to private values occur at regularly spaced clock times Tk = kγ
for a positive constant γ, where k ≥ 0 is an integer. Examples of scheduled information arrivals
include macroeconomic data releases and corporate earnings announcements.
Proposition 5. Suppose Tk = kγ for a positive constant γ. Then W (∆) < W (γ) for any
∆ < γ. That is, ∆∗ ≥ γ.
Proposition 5 shows that if new information repeatedly arrives at scheduled times, then the
optimal trading frequency cannot be higher than the frequency of information arrivals.
Now we provide a heuristic argument and describe the intuition behind Proposition 5. First,
we show in Appendix C.6 (Lemma 3) that for any information arrival process,
X1(∆) =
1 + d
nα− 1
(
λ
2r
σ20 +
λ
2r
∞∑
t=1
e−rt∆
n∑
i=1
E[(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)2]
)
. (49)
In the expression of X1(∆), the term
λ
2r
σ20 is the time-0 allocative inefficiency, whereas the
term λ
2r
∑∞
t=1 e
−rt∆∑n
i=1 E[(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)2] measures the time-discounted cumulative change
in the competitive allocation caused by arrivals of new information. Combined, the terms in the
big parenthesis represent the time-discounted total amount of allocative inefficiency, measured
at trading times, that can be potentially eliminated by holding double auctions. The leading
multiplier, 1+d
nα−1 = L, is the fraction of the total inefficiency that remains in the market due
to the strategic behavior of traders (see Proposition 4 and the discussion of the multiplier L
following the proposition).
12To see this, note that Z/n is the efficient allocation to each trader if the initial total signals of all traders
are zero. For each trader i, the total signal si,0 received at time 0 has the same distribution as the innovation
si,Tk − si,Tk−1 . Thus, zei,0 − Z/n has the same distribution as zei,Tk − zei,Tk−1 for any k ≥ 1. Thus, σ20 = σ2z if
zi,0 = Z/n for all i.
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Next, we set ∆ = γ. In this special case, auction times and information arrival times are
perfectly aligned, and (49) reduces to
X1(γ) =
1 + d
nα− 1
(
λ
2r
σ20 +
λ
2r
∞∑
t=1
e−rtγσ2z
)
, (50)
where we have substituted in σ2z from Equation (47) and used the fact that z
c
i,Tk+∆
= zei,Tk .
Since there is no delay between the arrival of new information and trading, X2(γ) = 0.
Finally, we double the trading frequency by letting ∆ = γ/2 while holding γ fixed. Auctions
at times 0, γ = 2∆, 2γ = 4∆, ..., still happen right after new information arrives, so X2(∆)
remains zero. But auctions at time 0.5γ = ∆, 1.5γ = 3∆, 2.5γ = 5∆, ..., happen strictly
between information arrivals. Obviously, zci,(t+1)γ − zci,(t+0.5)γ = 0 and zci,tγ+0.5γ − zci,tγ 6= 0.
Therefore, after doubling the trading frequency, the terms in the big parenthesis of Equation
(50) remain the same, but the leading multiplier, 1+d
nα−1 , goes up because 1 + d is larger if ∆ is
smaller (see Proposition 4). Thus, doubling the trading frequency increases the inefficiency X1.
By the same argument, X1(γ/k) < X1(γ) for any positive integer k ≥ 2.
In the appendix, we prove that choosing any ∆ < γ is suboptimal even if γ/∆ is not an
integer, that is, even if trading times do not entirely cover information arrival times. This
general case is not trivial because it involves tradeoffs between X1(∆) and X2(∆).
Proposition 5 establishes that the optimal trading frequency cannot be strictly higher than
information frequency. Next, we ask if the optimal trading frequency can be strictly lower than
information frequency. As ∆ increases beyond γ, X2(∆) is generally positive. Thus, traders
face the basic tradeoff we discussed at the beginning of this section: a large ∆ > γ induces
more aggressive trading per period, but incurs the cost that traders cannot react quickly to
new information.
The welfare W (∆) is hard to analyze if ∆/γ is not an integer. For analytical tractability
but at no cost of economic intuition, for the case of ∆ > γ we restrict attention to ∆ = lγ for
a positive integer l. Let l∗ ∈ argmaxl∈Z+ W (lγ).
Proposition 6. Suppose that Tk = kγ for a positive constant γ. The following results hold.
1. If zi,0 = Z/n for every trader i (i.e., σ
2
0 = σ
2
z), then l
∗ = 1.
2. If σ20/σ
2
z remains bounded as n→∞, then l∗ = 1 as n→∞.
Part 1 of Proposition 6 states a sharp result: for the steady-state specification σ20 = σ
2
z , the
optimal trading frequency is equal to the information frequency. To see the intuition, consider,
for instance, slowing down trading from ∆ = γ to ∆ = 2γ. Reducing the trading frequency by a
half will make demand schedules more aggressive at times 0, 2γ, 4γ, . . . , at the cost of entirely
disabling reaction to new information at times γ, 3γ, 5γ, . . . . But because new information at
each arrival time is equally informative and in expectation shocks the zero-delay competitive
allocation by the same magnitude, there is no reason to let traders trade very aggressively over
half of the news but shut down trading for the other half. Instead, it is better to allow equal
opportunities respond to all information arrivals. That is, l∗ = 1. This intuition applies to any
∆ = lγ for an integer l > 1. The proof of Proposition 6 makes this intuitive argument formal.
Part 2 of Proposition 6 allows the time-0 information to be different from information that
arrives later. A sufficient condition for σ20/σ
2
z remaining bounded as n → ∞ is E[
∑n
i=1(zi,0 −
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Z/n)2] = O(n). If σ20 > σ
2
z , for instance, it is possible that the optimal l
∗ > 1 so that eliminating
the time-0 allocative inefficiency is more important than allowing immediate reaction to less
important news later. That said, in a large market it is still asymptotically optimal to align
trading times with information arrival times. The intuition is that as n increases sufficiently,
the market becomes almost competitive, and the inefficiency associated with strategic demand
reduction diminishes. In the limit as n → ∞, X1(∆) → 0, and the allocation efficiency is
entirely determined by how fast traders can react to new information. Thus, the optimal
l∗ = 1.
Discussion of Vayanos (1999). We close this subsection with a discussion on the sim-
ilarity and difference between our welfare results under scheduled information arrivals and
those of Vayanos (1999). In Vayanos’s model, trading times and information times (inventory
shocks) are perfectly aligned, and there is no asymmetric information about the common div-
idend. Thus, his model corresponds to the case of ∆ = γ and α = 1 in our model. Moreover,
Vayanos’s measure of welfare loss as inventory shocks go to zero is equivalent to the leading
multiplier 1+d
nα−1 = L in Equation (50) in our model.
13 Thus, his result that faster trading
reduces welfare is equivalent to the comparative statics of ∂L
∂∆
< 0, which is also how we prove
that X1(γ/k) > X1(γ). In addition, his result on the convergence rate to efficiency as the
market gets large can be reproduced in our model by setting α = 1.14
Nonetheless, our results on scheduled information arrival complement Vayanos (1999)’s in
two ways. First, we separately model trading times and information arrival times. This gen-
eral setting allows us to prove that the trading process should never outpace the information
arrival process and that trading times should be aligned to news times under certain conditions
(Proposition 5 and Proposition 6). These results are far from obvious ex ante. Second, our
model incorporates adverse selection about the common dividend (α < 1). Appendix B.2 shows
that the presence of adverse selection, however small, slows down the speed of convergence to
efficiency as the market becomes large. Specifically, as n → ∞ and with adverse selection,
X1/n converges to zero at the rate of n
−4/3 for any fixed ∆ > 0, but the convergence rate
of (lim∆→0X1)/n is n−2/3; the corresponding rate without adverse selection is n−2 and n−1,
respectively.
Our most novel results about trading frequency, relative to Vayanos (1999), come from
stochastic arrivals of information. When information arrival times are no longer predictable, it
is in general not possible to align trading times with information arrival times. It is in those
situations that the decoupling of trading times and information arrival times provides the most
interesting economics and practical relevance. We turn to stochastic information arrivals next.
13Vayanos’s measure of welfare loss as inventory shocks go to zero has the same functional form as L defined
in Proposition 4 (see his Proposition 6.1), but L = 1+dnα−1 by Equation (41), which corresponds to his Equation
(E.2).
14In our model, as ∆→ 0, 1+d→ 1, so the per-trader inefficiency measure X1/n (cf. Equation (50)) becomes
of order 1/(nα−1). On the other hand, as ∆→∞, 1 +d→ 1/(nα−1), so X1/n becomes of order 1/(nα−1)2.
(Using X1/n, instead of X1, is necessary here because σ
2
0 and σ
2
z both measure inefficiency across all n traders
and hence are of order O(n).) In the special case of α = 1, these orders of magnitude reduce to O(1/n) and
O(1/n2), which are the same as those in Vayanos (1999) (see his Corollary 6.2).
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3.3 Stochastic arrivals of new information
We now consider stochastic arrivals of information. Examples of stochastic news include un-
expected corporate announcements (e.g., mergers and acquisitions), regulatory actions, and
geopolitical events. There are many possible specifications for stochastic information arrivals,
and it is technically hard to calculate the optimal trading frequency for all of them. Instead,
we analyze the simple yet natural case of a Poisson process for news arrivals. We expect the
economic intuition of the results to apply to more general signal structures.
Suppose that the timing of the news shocks {Tk}k≥1 follows a homogeneous Poisson process
with intensity µ > 0. (The first shock still arrives at time T0 = 0.) Since the time interval
between two consecutive news shocks has the expectation 1/µ, µ is analogous to 1/γ from
Section 3.2. There are in expectation ∆µ arrivals of new information during an interval of length
∆, and each arrival of information shocks the squared difference in the zero-delay competitive
allocation by σ2z (see Equation (47)). Thus,
n∑
i=1
E[(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)2] = ∆µσ2z , (51)
n∑
i=1
E[(zei,τ − zci,τ )2] = (τ − t∆)µσ2z , τ ∈ (t∆, (t+ 1)∆). (52)
To gain further intuition, we now focus on the natural case that all traders are ex-ante
identical (i.e., σ20 = σ
2
z) and explicitly spell out X1(∆) and X2(∆) from the decomposition (46):
X1(∆) =
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
1 +
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆µ
)
σ2z , (53)
X2(∆) =
λ
2r
E
[∫ ∞
τ=0
re−rτ (zci,τ − zei,τ )2 dτ
]
=
λ
2r
(
1
r
− ∆e
−r∆
1− e−r∆
)
µσ2z . (54)
Here, the expression X1(∆) is obtained by substituting the squared difference in Equation (51)
into Equation (49) of X1(∆) (Equation (49) holds for any information arrival process). We
have also used Lemma 2 (Appendix C.6) to write X2(∆) as the expected squared difference
between zci,τ and z
e
i,τ , for which Equation (52) applies. In fact, the final expression of X2(∆)
can be rewritten as the more intuitive form:
X2(∆) =
λ
2
·
(∫ ∞
0
e−rτdτ −
∞∑
t=1
e−rt∆∆
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Misalignment of information arrival times and trading times
· µσ
2
z
r
.
The first term λ/2 is the multiplier of quadratic holding cost. The middle term in the bracket
represents the misalignment of information arrival times and trading times, for it is the difference
between an integral and its ∆-discrete counterpart, a summation. The third term is the expected
variance of the change in the zero-delay competitive allocation per unit of time, µσ2z , multiplied
by the expected waiting time until the dividend is paid, 1/r. Note that the misalignment term
only involves the Poisson information arrivals after time 0, since the first information arrival
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time coincides with the first trading time, time 0. The misalignment term and hence X2(∆)
vanish as ∆→ 0, i.e., there is zero welfare cost from trading delay if trading is continuous.
The total inefficiency of the strategic equilibrium is
X(∆) ≡ X1(∆) +X2(∆) = λ
2r
σ2z
[
µ
r
+ 1−
(
1− 1 + d
nα− 1
)(
1 +
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆µ
)]
. (55)
We see that under Poisson news arrivals both terms X1(∆) and X2(∆) are generally positive.
We thus expect an interior optimal ∆∗. Clearly, the optimal ∆∗ is independent of λ.
The following proposition, the main result of this subsection, characterizes the optimal
trading frequency in the case of ex-ante identical traders.
Proposition 7. Suppose that {Tk}k≥1 is a Poisson process with intensity µ, and zi,0 = Z/n for
every trader i (i.e., σ20 = σ
2
z). Then the following holds.
1. The optimal trading frequency has the lower bound
1
∆∗
≥
(
nα
2
− 1
3
)
µ. (56)
In particular, we always have 1
∆∗ >
2
3
µ since nα > 2 by assumption.
2. ∆∗ strictly decreases in µ, n and σ2w, and strictly increases in σ
2
D.
Part 1 of Proposition 7 shows a lower bound of the optimal trading frequency that is only a
function of n, µ, and α but is independent of r. The multiplier in front of µ can be quite large.
For examples, we expect α to be much closer to 1 than to 2/n for “liquid” assets, namely those
with wide investor participation (large n), low information asymmetry (low σ2D or low σ
2
 ), and
high liquidity-driven trading motives (high σ2w). In particular, as we discussed in Section 2.2,
α = 1 if σ2D = 0 (pure private value) or if σ
2
 = 0 (public information about common value).
These liquid assets include major equity indices, government securities, and foreign currencies,
as well as the corresponding futures contracts.
A comparison between Part 1 of Proposition 7 and Proposition 5 reveals the major differ-
ence between scheduled and stochastic information arrivals. Take the case of ex-ante identical
traders. Under scheduled information arrivals, the optimal trading frequency is equal to the
information arrival frequency. Under stochastic information arrival, the optimal trading fre-
quency can be much higher than the information arrival frequency.
The comparative statics in Proposition 7 can be proven by directly calculating the mixed
partial derivative:
∂2X(∆)
∂∆∂µ
= − ∂
∂∆
[(
1− 1 + d
nα− 1
)
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆
]
> 0. (57)
Thus, ∆∗ is strictly decreasing in µ. Intuitively, if information arrives more frequently, the
optimal trading frequency should also increase in order to allow traders faster response to new
information.
By the same method, we can show that the optimal ∆∗ is strictly decreasing in nα. Since
α measures the lack of adverse selection, α is strictly increasing in the variance of private-value
shocks, σ2w, and is strictly decreasing in the variance of common-value shocks, σ
2
D. Hence, ∆
∗ is
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also strictly decreasing in σ2w and is strictly increasing in σ
2
D. Moreover, we can show that nα
is strictly increasing in n (even though α itself decreases with n), so ∆∗ is strictly decreasing in
n. The intuition is that if trading is motivated less by private information about the common
dividend and more by idiosyncratic private values, or if there are more traders, then traders
will submit more aggressive demand schedules. In those situations a higher-frequency market is
better because reducing delays in responding to new information becomes more pressing than
counteracting demand reduction.
We close this section with the following proposition on comparative statics when σ20 and σ
2
z
are potentially different.
Proposition 8. Suppose that {Tk}k≥1 is a Poisson process with intensity µ. The following
comparative statics holds:
1. If σ20 > 0, then ∆
∗ strictly decreases in µ from ∞ (as µ→ 0) to 0 (as µ→∞).
2. If σ20/σ
2
z remains bounded as n→∞, then ∆∗ → 0 as n→∞.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is similar to that of Proposition 7. In particular, continuous
trading becomes optimal in the limit as the market becomes large or as the arrival rate of new
information increases without bound.
3.4 Calibration of optimal trading frequency under stochastic news
arrivals
In this subsection we conduct a simple calibration exercise for the optimal trading frequency,
using U.S. futures and equities as examples. This exercise illustrates the practical use of the
model and its market-design implications. The resulting numbers, however, should be inter-
preted in their orders of magnitude instead of their exact levels. We will use actual data to
calibrate n and µ, whereas α and r will be set directly to reasonable numbers. Note that λ
does not affect the optimal trading frequency, so it is not a part of the input.
Futures market. We select four liquid contracts in U.S. futures markets for calibration: the
E-mini S&P 500 futures, the 10-year Treasury futures, the Euro futures, and the crude oil
futures. The sample period is from January 2013 to August 2016. All model parameters are
calibrated to the daily frequency as follows:
• n. For each of the four contracts and on each day, we set n to be the average number of
clearing accounts15 that trade the futures contract in question. This proprietary statistic
is provided by the CFTC.
• µ is calibrated in two ways.
15A firm could have multiple clearing accounts, and each clearing account may cover multiple trading desks or
funds. Since all margin and collateral are managed at the clearing account level, this level of granularity seems
to be suitable for our model because the inventory cost is partly motivated by margin and collateral constraints.
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Our first way of calibrating µ is to set it equal to the average number of transaction price
changes per day. In the model, the price changes if and only if news arrives. Hence, for
each futures contract, the number of news arrivals is taken to be
µ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
∑
k
1(pt,k 6= pt,k+1), (58)
where pt,k is the price of the k-th transaction on day t of the futures contract. This
number is directly provided by the CFTC.16
Our second way of calibrating µ is to set it to the daily average number of news articles
that are related to the relevant contract. Using the Reuters News Analytics database from
2003 to 2005, Hendershott, Livdan, and Schu¨rhoff (2015) enumerate the number of news
articles that are related to various topics, ranging from macroeconomic conditions (e.g.,
unemployment) to firm-specific news (e.g., earnings). Since the four futures contracts
are affected by the overall economic conditions, we count news articles in the following
set of topics: Major Breaking News, Macro News, Business Activities, Regulatory Issues,
Legislation, and Labor/(un)employment. Moreover, for the E-mini, 10-year Treasury, and
Euro futures, we respectively include news articles in the categories of Stock Markets,
Debt Markets, and Forex Markets. Importantly, news articles counted this way ignore
idiosyncratic liquidity needs (that do not make to the news) and hence should be treated
as a lower bound of the actual news arrival rate.
• α. In our model 1−α measures adverse selection. Since each of the four futures contracts
is about a broad market, we expect low adverse selection. So we set α = 1. Calibrating
α directly is much simpler and probably more robust than calibrating σD, σw, and σ
separately.
• r. In our model r represents the arrival rate of the liquidating dividend. For futures
contracts, the liquidating dividend could be interpreted as the mark-to-market value of
the contract at expiry. Since a futures contract tends to be most liquid for one month
(when it is the front-month contract), we set r = 1/30. In fact, the calibrated optimal
frequency is very insensitive to r, so this input is not critical.
Table 1 shows the calibrated optimal trading frequencies of the four futures contracts, to-
gether with the model inputs. In column 2 we observe that these four contracts attract wide
market participation in the thousands of clearing accounts per day, with the E-mini having
almost 10 thousand participants per day. Given the lower bound of 1/∆∗ in Proposition 7, the
large n already implies that the optimal trading frequency should be far larger than the news
arrival frequency by a factor between one thousand and five thousand, approximately.
Columns 3–5 show, respectively, the average number of price changes per day, the numer-
ically calculated optimal trading frequency per second, and the lower bound of the optimal
frequency per second implied by Proposition 7. We convert all daily frequencies to per-second
frequency using 23 trading hours per day. We observe that these four futures contracts have a
16Note that this number can also be obtained by purchasing trade-by-trade data from the CME or other
vendors.
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Table 1: Calibration of the optimal trading frequency for four futures contracts. We take
r = 1/30 and α = 1.
µ = # transaction price changes/day µ = # market-wide news/day
Contract n µ Optimal frequency Lower bound µ Optimal frequency Lower bound
(per day) (per second) (per second) (per day) (per second) (per second)
E-mini S&P 500 9840 32716 1943.8 1943.8 162.7 9.7 9.7
10-year Treasury 2647 4581 73.2 73.2 163.6 2.6 2.6
Euro 1914 12222 141.2 141.2 128.6 1.5 1.5
Crude oil 3964 31332 749.9 749.9 126.3 3.0 3.0
large µ ranging from 4.6 thousand to 32.7 thousand per day, implying that the optimal trading
frequency ranges from 73 to 1944 auctions per second, i.e., millisecond-level trading. The lower
bound in Proposition 7, (nα/2− 1/3)µ, turns out to be very tight.
The last three columns of Table 1 show the optimal trading frequency if news arrival rates
are calculated from the number of news articles. Depending on the contract, there are between
126 and 164 relevant news articles per day on average, implying that the optimal trading
frequency ranges from 1.5 to 9.7 double auctions per second. Unsurprisingly, due to a much
smaller µ, the frequency in column 7 is much lower than that in column 4. Again, the lower
bound (nα/2− 1/3)µ is very tight.
Overall, the futures market calibration suggests an optimal trading frequency ranging from
a few auctions per second to two thousand auctions per second.
Equity markets. Our sample period is October 2010, since this is the sample period for the
proprietary summary statistics provided by NASDAQ (described below). We use 146 stocks
for the calibration. Among those, 117 stocks are the same as the ones used in Menkveld,
Yueshen, and Zhu (2016). These 117 of stocks contain large-cap, medium-cap and small-cap
firms in approximately equal proportions. The remaining 29 stocks are a stratified sample
of very illiquid micro-cap stocks that have fewer than 100 trades per day during the sample
period.17 For each stock, the model parameters are calibrated to the daily frequency as follows:
• n. For each of the 117 stocks used in Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2016), NASDAQ
provides the daily average number of NASDAQ member firms that trade this stock. The
highest count is 219 (Apple), and the lowest is 22 (Delek). Since the NASDAQ counts
only include broker-dealers but not investors, they are likely to vastly understate the total
number of active participants in that stock. We adjust for this limitation by using the
17Specifically, we obtain the list of stocks that are in the basket for the iShares micro-cap ETF, as of September
2016. Then, we download all trades of these stocks in October 2010. The added 29 stocks are a stratified sample
of the subset of stocks that have fewer than 100 trader per day on average.
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following formula:
n = min
(
50× The daily average number of NASDAQ members trading the stock,
2× Average daily number of trades
)
. (59)
In this formula, the factor 50 is chosen so that the most liquid stocks like Apple and
Amazon have roughly the same n as the E-mini S&P 500 futures contract. But for less
liquid stocks, multiplying by 50 is likely to overstate the number of market participants.
For instance, Delek has 22 NASDAQ member count, and multiplying by 50 gives 1100.
However, Delek stock only has 208 trades per day on average. If each side of each of the
208 trades is a distinct investor, there would be only 2 × 208 = 416 investors actively
trading Delek on a typical day, rather than 1100. This observation motivates the second
part of the formula for n.
For each of the 29 illiquid micro-cap stocks, we simply set
n = 2× Average daily number of trades, (60)
since the NASDAQ summary statistics do not cover them.
• µ. As before, we calibrate µ in two ways. The first is to set µ to be the average number
of exchange transaction price changes per day, calculated from TAQ data.18 Our second
way is to set µ to be the average number of news articles per day that we use to calibrate
the E-mini futures contract, that is, 162.7 (see Table 1). The second method significantly
underestimates the actual µ because it only accounts for systematic information in news
articles, but not information idiosyncratic to the particular stock or liquidity needs of
particular traders. This µ should be interpreted as a (not too tight) lower bound.
• α. Individual stocks tend to have some degree of adverse selection. Since σ2 and σ2w are
unobservable, a direct calibration of α is difficult. We thus conduct separate calibrations
for two values of α, 0.9 and 0.1, that are near the boundaries of its range, [0, 1].
• r. Different from futures, stocks do not have an “expiration date,” so the date of the
“liquidating dividend” in the model should be interpreted as the date on which substantial
uncertainty regarding the stock’s fundamental value is resolved (even if temporarily).
Since the quarterly earnings announcements provide the most important fundamental
information about stocks, we set r = 1/90. Again, the calibrated optimal frequency is
insensitive to r, so this input is not critical.
Table 2 shows the calibrated optimal trading frequencies together with the model inputs for
stocks located at (or nearest to) key percentiles of the sample, sorted by the optimal trading
frequency in column 5 (see the discussion below). In column 3, we observe remarkable hetero-
geneity in the (estimated) number of active participants across stocks, ranging from about 6 at
the bottom to more than 10 thousand at the top.
18Different from futures contracts, some of stock trades are done off-exchange, or “in the dark,” with limited
or no price discovery. We thus eliminate those trades. See Zhu (2014) and Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2016)
for more discussions of dark trading in U.S. equity markets.
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Table 2: Calibrated optimal trading frequency for stocks at (or nearest to) various percentiles
of the sample, sorted by the calibrated optimal trading frequency in column 5. We set r = 1/90.
µ = # of transaction price changes/day µ = # stock market-wide news/day (162.7)
Ticker n µ Optimal frequency Optimal frequency Optimal frequency Optimal frequency
(per day) (per second), α = 0.9 (per second), α = 0.1 (per second), α = 0.9 (per second), α = 0.1
Max AAPL 10950 41286.1 8693.3 965.4 34.3 3.8
Pct 95 MOS 6250 7947.5 955.1 106.0 19.6 2.2
Pct 90 PFE 6150 4967.0 587.4 65.2 19.2 2.1
Pct 75 GLW 5000 3037.6 292.0 32.4 15.6 1.7
Median SF 2731 668.7 35.1 3.9 8.5 0.9
Pct 25 KNOL 823 188.9 2.9881 0.3296 2.5749 0.2840
Pct 10 RVSB 101 11.4 0.0220 0.0023 0.3136 0.0328
Pct 5 STS 42 6.7 0.0053 0.0005 0.1288 0.0123
Min KINS 5.6 1.1 0.0001 na 0.0153 na
Column 4 shows the model input µ, calibrated to the average number of transaction price
changes per day. Columns 5 and 6 show the corresponding optimal frequency per second19 for
α = 0.9 and α = 0.1, respectively. We observe that the top half of the stocks have an optimal
trading frequency ranging from several double auctions to several thousand double auctions per
second. The bottom quartile of stocks, however, tend to have much lower optimal frequencies,
generally slower than one auction per second and sometimes slower than one auction per minute
(one auction per minute corresponds to an optimal frequency of 1/60 = 0.167). The bottom
stock has n = 5.6, so under α = 0.1 the linear equilibrium does not exist since nα < 2.
The last two columns show the sample stocks’ optimal trading frequencies per second if µ
is set to the number of news articles per day that we use to calibrate the E-mini, that is, 162.7
(see Table 1). Unsurprisingly, under this much lower µ, the optimal frequency for the top half
of the stocks drops significantly, ranging from one to 34 double auctions per second. For the
bottom quartile of the stocks, however, the optimal frequency is similar in order of magnitude
to that in columns 5 and 6, i.e., in seconds or minutes per double auction.
The robust pattern from the stocks calibration is that, as in futures contracts, stocks that
have broad market participation are optimally traded with sub-second delays. But stocks that
have narrow participation can benefit from a moderate market slowdown to seconds or even
minutes per double auction.
Summary. A policy implication coming out of this calibration exercise is that, if regulators
or marketplaces were to implement mechanisms that slow down the market, it makes the most
sense to start with stocks that have the lowest investor participation, which tend to be small- and
micro-cap stocks. By contrast, stocks and futures contracts with broad investor participation
have a wide range of calibrated optimal trading frequency, from a few auctions to a few thousand
auctions per second, so a market slowdown is not necessarily warranted. Again, the calibration
illustrates and reinforces the model implication that the optimal trading frequency depends
on properties of the specific asset, such as the level of investor participation and the arrival
19Since trading hours in U.S. equity markets last from 9:30am to 4:00pm ET, the per-second frequency is
converted from the daily frequency by dividing by 390× 60 seconds per day.
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frequency of relevant news. Hence, policies that aim to adjust trading speed should take such
heterogeneity into account.
Given the relevant data, the calibration exercise shown here can be conducted on electronic
markets for other assets, such as ETFs, options, government securities, and foreign exchange,
as well as in other jurisdictions.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present and solve a dynamic model in which a finite number of traders receive
private information over time and trade strategically with demand schedules in a sequence of
double auctions. We characterize a linear equilibrium with stationary strategies in closed form.
The equilibrium price aggregates a weighted sum of signals about the common value and the
private values, but the two components cannot be separated from the price. Due to imperfect
competition, the equilibrium allocation is not fully efficient, but it converges to the efficient
allocation exponentially over time. The presence of adverse selection—asymmetric information
regarding the common-value component of the asset—slows down this convergence speed.
We use this modeling framework to study the optimal trading frequency that maximizes
allocative efficiency. Trading frequency is measured as the number of double auctions per unit
of clock time. A higher trading frequency reduces the aggressiveness of demand schedules, but
allows more immediate reactions to new information. The allocative inefficiency in this dynamic
market can be decomposed into two parts: one part due to strategic behavior and the other
due to delayed responses to new information. The optimal tradeoff between these two effects
depends on the nature of information. If new information arrives at scheduled time intervals,
the optimal trading frequency is never higher than the information frequency, and these two
frequencies coincide if traders are ex-ante identical. By contrast, if new information arrives as a
Poisson process, the optimal trading frequency can be much higher than the information arrival
frequency, and we explicitly characterize a lower bound for the optimal trading frequency.
We illustrate the application of the model by calibrating the optimal trading frequency of
four liquid futures contracts and a sample of 146 stocks in U.S. markets. Using reasonable
and data-derived proxies for the model parameters, we find that the model-implied optimal
trading frequencies for the futures contracts and the top half of sample stocks (in terms of
investor participation) are optimally traded with between-auction delays less than a second and
sometimes as low as milliseconds. By contrast, stocks with lower investor participation, such as
small- and micro-cap stocks, have an optimal frequency in the order of seconds or minutes per
auction. This calibration suggests that a moderate market slowdown can improve allocative
efficiency for small- and micro-cap stocks, but not necessarily for large stocks, futures contracts,
or other liquid securities with broad investor participation. More broadly, our analysis suggests
that market design in terms of speed should take into account asset heterogeneity, such as
heterogeneity in the level of investor participation and the arrival frequency of news.
Our results are useful not only for markets that are already centralized and electronic, but
also for over-the-counter (OTC) markets that are moving toward all-to-all electronic trading,
such as those for corporate bonds, interest rate swaps, and credit default swaps. If exchange-like
trading for these OTC instruments were deemed desirable by investors and regulators, periodic
auctions could be a more natural place to start than continuous trading.
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While our model captures two important effects of increasing market speed, it does not
capture all effects. For instance, our model ignores the investments spent on speeding up the
market. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) suggest that too much such investment is made and
prescribe a tax. Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) argue that continuous limit order books
should be replaced by frequent double auctions. Our result that assets with narrow investor
participation can benefit from a moderate market slowdown is consistent with their conclusions.
We go beyond their results in this direction by providing explicit formulas that can be used to
calibrate the optimal trading frequency.
A discussion of heterogeneous trading speeds. Heterogeneous trading speeds would be
an interesting direction for future research. That certain traders are faster than others has been
a persistent feature of financial markets, and this issue has generated renewed and passionate
debate in the context of high-frequency trading. We conclude this article with a discussion of
heterogeneous speeds that is mainly based on calculations that appear in an early version of
the paper. Since those calculations are conducted under somewhat restrictive assumptions, we
will focus on intuition that we believe is robust in more general settings.
In a model with sequential double auctions, a trader’s speed could be defined by how
frequently he accesses the market. For example, a fast trader can participate in all double
auctions no matter how frequently the auctions are held, but a slower trader can only participate
in auctions at, say, one-second time intervals.20 The latter implies that during any time interval
of one second, each slow trader joins the market exactly once.21 Moreover, this way of modeling
speed heterogeneity does not require heterogeneous information about asset fundamentals; in
particular, it does not endow the fast traders with superior information of any kind.22 Instead,
trading is generated by shocks to private values or inventories.
Modeled this way, speed heterogeneity creates a discrepancy between fast and slow traders’
preferred market designs. For intuition, let us start with double auctions that are held once
per second, at times 1, 2, 3, . . . (in unit of seconds). For the reason mentioned above, all slow
traders can participate in each double auction together with all fast traders. Now, let us speed
up the market ten times so that one auction is held every 100 milliseconds, at times 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, . . . (again in seconds). Unless all slow traders happen to come to the market within a
100-millisecond time interval, they are effectively “partitioned” by the more frequent auctions.
20In practical terms, the fast traders could be high-frequency traders who install their computer servers next to
the stock exchange’s server, whereas the slow traders could be other investors or broker-dealers whose computer
system has a one-second delay in accessing the exchange’s matching engine.
21Within each one-second time interval, whether slow trades show up at random or deterministic times is a
modeling choice, but this technical choice is unlikely to affect the economic intuition discussed below.
22The existing literature on high-frequency traders has so far focused on the information advantage of HFTs.
For instance, in Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) and Jovanovic and Menkveld (2012), HFTs have outright
fundamental information. In Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015); Hoffmann (2014), HFTs obtain public news
faster than others so they can quickly use market orders to make profit or cancel stale limit orders to avoid a
loss. In Yang and Zhu (2016), HFTs observe signals of executed orders of informed investors and hence learn
fundamental information. To the best of our knowledge, two papers in the HFT literature model the feature
that faster traders have more opportunities to trade. In Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015), fast institutions
find trading opportunities for sure, whereas slow institutions can only trade with some probability. In Cespa
and Vives (2016), high-frequency traders trade in two periods, whereas other dealers trade only in one period.
In both models, market participants form continuums and hence are competitive. Our model is strategic.
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For instance, we only expect a fraction of slow traders to show up in the market in the time
interval [0, 0.1], and they can trade in the first double auction or delay until a later double
auction. Trading in the first auction saves a slow trader inventory cost, but also incurs the
trader a higher price impact cost because only a fraction of the participants are in the market
by the time of the first auction. In particular, these early-arriving slow traders cannot commit
to never trading in the first double auction, because a slow trader receiving a sufficiently large
inventory shock would prefer immediately liquidating part of the inventory to holding everything
until a later auction (recall inventory cost is quadratic). But given the one-second time delay,
once this early-arriving slow trader participates in the first double auction at time 0.1, he can
only return to the market at time 1.1, thus skipping the nine auctions at times 0.2, 0.3, ...,
1 and inadvertently making price impact higher in those auctions by his absence. By similar
reasoning, no slow trader who arrives in the interval (0.1, 0.2] can commit to never trading in
the second double auction; if he does trade in the second auction, he would skip auctions at
times 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, . . . , 1.1 and inadvertently make price impact higher in those auctions by his
absence. This argument applies to all slow traders.
Summarizing, since no individual slow trader can commit to waiting when early trading
with fast traders is an option, a more frequent market effectively partitions the slow traders
into more non-overlapping groups in expectation. As a consequence, each double auction has
a higher price impact in expectation. We can show that, at least in a simplistic and restrictive
setting, the slow traders collectively prefer to bunch together and synchronize their trading
times to obtain a lower price impact, but the lack of commitment to delaying defeats this
purpose for reasons mentioned above. Fast traders, on the other hand, benefit from a higher
market frequency because partitioning slow traders into multiple groups increases price impact
and hence their profits of providing liquidity. In fact, in a simplistic setting, we can show
that the fast traders wish to hold double auctions so frequently that they only interact with
exactly one slow trader at a time. By contrast, slow traders prefer a strictly lower market
frequency, which enables them to synchronize their trading and reducing price impact. The
broader takeaway of this analysis, to be made more rigorous in subsequent work, is that a
market speed-up has heterogeneous impacts on various groups of participants, with the fastest
market participants benefiting the most.
Future work on speed heterogeneity may require a careful (re)selection of model components
that approximate institutional reality reasonably well and simultaneously retain tractability.
The “winning” model that best tackles heterogeneous speeds may turn out to be quite different
from the current model of this paper that analyzes the optimal trading frequency under ho-
mogeneous speed. For instance, should trading times be modeled as deterministic or random?
How do traders keep track of or infer each others’ inventories over time, especially because not
all traders are present at all times? Is it possible to avoid the forecasting-the-forecast-of-others
problem and an explosion in the number of state variables, and if not, are there reasonable
heuristics that one can use to obtain tractability? Finally, can we embed information asymme-
try about the fundamental value into a model of speed heterogeneity? Building such a model
is far beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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A List of Model Variables
Variable Explanation
Sections 2–3, Exogenous Variables
t Discrete trading period , t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . }
τ Continuous clock time, τ ∈ [0,∞)
∆ Length of each trading period
T , r The clock time T of dividend payment has an exponential distribution with
intensity r > 0.
{Tk}k∈{0,1,2,... } Times of shocks to the common dividend and private values
DTk The common dividend value immediately after the k-th shock
σ2D Each dividend shock DTk −DTk−1 has the distribution N (0, σ2D).
Si,Tk Trader i’s signal about the k-th dividend shock
σ2 The noise in trader i’s dividend signal regarding the k-th dividend shock,
Si,Tk − (DTk −DTk−1), has the distribution N (0, σ2 ).
wi,Tk Trader i’s private value for the asset immediately after the k-th shock
σ2w Shocks to each trader i’s private value, wi,Tk −wi,Tk−1 , has the distribution
N (0, σ2w).
vi,τ DTk + wi,Tk if Tk is the last shock before τ
λ Before the dividend is paid, the flow cost for holding asset position q is
0.5λq2 per unit of clock time for each trader.
Z The total inventory held by all traders, Z ≡∑1≤j≤n zj,0
γ Time interval of scheduled information arrivals
µ Intensity of stochastic information arrivals
Sections 2–3, Endogenous Variables
zi,t∆ Trader i’s inventory level right before the period-t double auction
xi,t∆(p) Trader i’s demand schedule in the period-t double auction
p∗t∆ The equilibrium price in period-t double auction
Hi,t∆ Trader i’s history (information set) up to time t∆ but before the period-t
double auction, defined in Equation (10)
si,Tk Trader i’s total signal right after the k-th shock, defined in Equation (20)
Vi,t∆ The expected utility of trader i in period t, conditional on Hi,t∆
χ, α Constants defined in Section 2.2
zci,t∆ The competitive allocation immediately before trading in period-t auction
zei,τ Zero-delay competitive allocation
σ2z , σ
2
0 Constants defined in Equations (47) and (48)
W (∆) Welfare under homogeneous speed and trading interval ∆
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B Additional Results
B.1 The continuous-time limit of Proposition 2
In this appendix we examine the limit of the equilibrium in Proposition 2 as ∆ → 0 (i.e., as trading
becomes continuous in clock time) and its efficiency properties.
Proposition 9. As ∆→ 0, the equilibrium of Proposition 2 converges to the following perfect Bayesian
equilibrium:
1. Trader i’s equilibrium strategy is represented by a process {x∞i,τ}τ≥0. At the clock time τ , x∞i,τ
specifies trader i’s rate of order submission and is defined by
x∞i,τ (p; si,τ , zi,τ ) = b
∞
(
si,τ − p− λ(n− 1)
r(nα− 1)zi,τ +
λ(1− α)
r(nα− 1)Z
)
, (61)
where
b∞ =
r2(nα− 1)(nα− 2)
2λ(n− 1) . (62)
Given a clock time τ > 0, in equilibrium the total amount of trading by trader i in the clock-time
interval [0, τ ] is
z∗i,τ − zi,0 =
∫ τ
τ ′=0
x∞i,τ ′(p
∗
τ ′ ; si,τ ′ , z
∗
i,τ ′) dτ
′. (63)
2. The equilibrium price at any clock time τ is
p∗τ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
si,τ − λ
nr
Z. (64)
3. Given any 0 ≤ τ < τ , if si,τ = si,τ for all i and all τ ∈ [τ , τ ], then the equilibrium inventories
z∗i,τ in this interval satisfy:
z∗i,τ − zei,τ = e−
1
2
r(nα−2)(τ−τ) (z∗i,τ − zei,τ) , (65)
where
zei,τ ≡
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
si,τ − 1
n
n∑
j=1
sj,τ
+ 1
n
Z (66)
is the competitive allocation at clock time τ (cf. Equation (26)).
Proof. The proof follows by directly calculating the limit of Proposition 2 as ∆→ 0 using L’Hopitaˆl’s
rule.
Proposition 9 reveals that even if trading occurs continuously, in equilibrium the competitive allo-
cation is not reached instantaneously. The delay comes from traders’ price impact and the associated
demand reduction. This feature is also obtained by Vayanos (1999). Although submitting aggressive
orders allows a trader to achieve his desired allocation sooner, aggressive bidding also moves the price
against the trader and increases his trading cost. Facing this tradeoff, each trader uses a finite rate
of order submission in the limit. As in Proposition 4, the rate of convergence to the competitive
allocation in Proposition 9, r(nα − 2)/2, is increasing in n, r, and σ2w but decreasing in σ2D. (The
proof of Proposition 4 shows that ∂(nα)/∂σ2w > 0, ∂(nα)/∂σ
2
D < 0, and ∂(nα)/∂n > 0.)
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B.2 Convergence rate to efficiency in large markets
To further explore the effect of adverse selection for allocative efficiency, and to compare with the
literature (in particular with Vayanos (1999)), we consider the rate at which inefficiency vanishes as
the number of traders becomes large, with and without adverse selection. Adverse selection exists if
σ2D > 0 and σ
2
 > 0. For fixed σ
2
 > 0 and σ
2
w > 0, we compare the convergence rate in the case of a
fixed σ2D > 0 to that in the case of σ
2
D = 0.
We consider the inefficiency caused by strategic behavior, that is, the difference between the
total ex-ante utility in the strategic equilibrium of Proposition 2 and the total ex-ante utility in the
competitive equilibrium:
X1(∆) ≡ E
[ ∞∑
t=0
(e−rt∆ − e−r(t+1)∆)
n∑
i=1
((
vi,t∆z
∗
i,(t+1)∆ −
λ
2r
(z∗i,(t+1)∆)
2
)
(67)
−
(
vi,t∆z
c
i,(t+1)∆ −
λ
2r
(zci,(t+1)∆)
2
))]
,
where {z∗i,(t+1)∆} is strategic allocation given by Equation (36), and zci,(t+1)∆ is the competitive allo-
cation given by Equation (26). This X1(∆) is the same as that defined in Section 3. As usual, prices
do not enter the welfare criterion as they are transfers.
Proposition 10. Suppose that the news times {Tk}k≥1 either satisfy Tk = kγ for a constant γ > 0 or
are given by a homogeneous Poisson process. Suppose also that σ2 > 0, σ
2
w > 0, and
1
n
∑n
i=1 E[(zi,0 −
zei,0)
2] is bounded as n becomes large. Then, the following convergence results hold:
1. If σ2D > 0, then as n→∞:
X1(∆)
n
converges to zero at the rate n−4/3 for any ∆ > 0,
lim
∆→0
X1(∆)
n
converges to zero at the rate n−2/3.
2. If σ2D = 0, then as n→∞:
X1(∆)
n
converges to zero at the rate n−2 for any ∆ > 0,
lim
∆→0
X1(∆)
n
converges to zero at the rate n−1.
The convergence rates under σ2D = 0 (i.e., pure private values) are also obtained in the model of
Vayanos (1999), who is the first to show that convergence rates differ between discrete-time trading
and continuous-time trading. Relative to the results of Vayanos (1999), Proposition 10 reveals that
the rate of convergence is slower if traders are subject to adverse selection. For any fixed ∆ > 0 and
as n → ∞, the inefficiency X1(∆)/n vanishes at the rate of n−4/3 if σ2D > 0, but the corresponding
rate is n−2 if σ2D = 0. If one first takes the limit of ∆ → 0, then the convergence rates as n becomes
large are n−2/3 and n−1 with and without adverse selection, respectively. (The limiting behavior of
the strategic equilibrium as ∆→ 0 is stated in Appendix B.1.) Interestingly, the asymptotic rates do
not depend on the size of σ2D but only depend on whether σ
2
D is positive or not.
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C Proofs
C.1 Construction of total signals
In this appendix we show details of the construction of the total signals in Equation (20). The
total signals are subsequently used in the strategies of the competitive benchmark and the strategic
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For any constant x, we have:
E
[
vi,Tk
∣∣∣∣Hi,Tk ∪{∑j 6=i
(
x
∑k
l=0
Sj,Tl + wj,Tk
)}]
(68)
=wi,Tk +
1/(x2σ2 )
1/(x2σ2D) + 1/(x
2σ2 ) + (n− 1)/(x2σ2 + σ2w)
k∑
l=0
Si,Tl
+
1/(x2σ2 + σ
2
w)
1/(x2σ2D) + 1/(x
2σ2 ) + (n− 1)/(x2σ2 + σ2w)
· 1
x
∑
j 6=i
(
x
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + wj,Tk
) .
Proof. Define
S˜i,Tl ≡ xSi,Tl + wi,Tl − wi,Tl−1 . (69)
By the projection theorem for multivariate normal distribution:
E
[
DTl −DTl−1 | Si,Tl ,
∑
j 6=i S˜j,Tl
]
(70)
= (xσ2D, (n− 1)xσ2D) ·
(
x2(σ2D + σ
2
 ) (n− 1)x2σ2D
(n− 1)x2σ2D (n− 1)(x2(σ2D + σ2 ) + σ2w) + (n− 1)(n− 2)x2σ2D
)−1
·
(
xSi,Tl ,
∑
j 6=i S˜j,Tl
)′
.
We compute:(
x2(σ2D + σ
2
 ) (n− 1)x2σ2D
(n− 1)x2σ2D (n− 1)(x2(σ2D + σ2 ) + σ2w) + (n− 1)(n− 2)x2σ2D
)−1
=
(
(n− 1)(x2σ2 + σ2w) + (n− 1)2x2σ2D −(n− 1)x2σ2D
−(n− 1)x2σ2D x2(σ2D + σ2 )
)
· 1
(n− 1)x2(x2σ2 + σ2w)(σ2D + σ2 ) + (n− 1)2x4σ2Dσ2
,
and
E
[
DTl −DTl−1 | Si,Tl ,
∑
j 6=i S˜j,Tl
]
=
(n− 1)x2σ2D(x2σ2 + σ2w)Si,Tl + (n− 1)x3σ2Dσ2
∑
j 6=i S˜j,Tl
(n− 1)x2(x2σ2 + σ2w)(σ2D + σ2 ) + (n− 1)2x4σ2Dσ2
=
(1/x2σ2 )Si,Tl + (1/(x
2σ2 + σ
2
w))
1
x
∑
j 6=i S˜j,Tl
1/(x2σ2 ) + 1/(x
2σ2D) + (n− 1)/(x2σ2 + σ2w)
.
Summing the above equation across l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} and adding wi,Tk gives Equation (68).
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By Equation (68), we have
E
[
vi,Tk
∣∣∣∣Hi,Tk ∪{∑j 6=i
(
χ
∑k
l=0
Sj,Tl + wj,Tk
)}]
=wi,Tk + χ
k∑
l=0
Si,Tl +
1/(χ2σ2 + σ
2
w)
1/(χ2σ2D) + 1/(χ
2σ2 ) + (n− 1)/(χ2σ2 + σ2w)
· 1
χ
∑
j 6=i
(
χ
k∑
l=0
Sj,Tl + wj,Tk
)
=αsi,Tk +
1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,Tk ,
where in the second line we used the definition of χ in Equation (19), and in the third line we used
the definition of si,Tk in Equation (20), and the definition of α:
α ≡ 1
1 + (n−1)/(χ
2σ2+σ
2
w)
1/(χ2σ2D)+1/(χ
2σ2 )+(n−1)/(χ2σ2+σ2w) ·
1
χ
=
χ2σ2 + σ
2
w
nχ2σ2 + σ
2
w
. (71)
C.2 Verification of the competitive equilibrium strategy
The value function of trader i, rewritten from Equation (12), is:
max
{xi,t′∆}t′≥t
∞∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)∆E
[
(1− e−r∆)
(
vi,t′∆(z
c
i,t′∆ + xi,t′∆(p
c
t′∆))−
λ
2r
(zci,t′∆ + xi,t′∆(p
c
t′∆))
2
)
− pct′∆ · xi,t′∆(pct′∆)
∣∣∣∣ Hi,t′∆, pct′∆
]
. (72)
The first-order condition of (72) with respect to xi,t∆ at the competitive equilibrium {xci,t′∆}t′≥t is
E
[ ∞∑
t′=t
e−r(t
′−t)∆
(
(1− e−r∆)
(
vi,t′∆ − λ
r
(zci,t′∆ + x
c
i,t′∆(p
c
t′∆))
)
∂(zci,t′∆ + x
c
i,t′∆(p
c
t′∆))
∂xci,t∆(p
c
t∆)
− pct′∆
∂xci,t′∆(p
c
t′∆)
∂xci,t∆(p
c
t∆)
) ∣∣∣∣ Hi,t∆, pct∆
]
= 0. (73)
Under the derived strategy xci,t∆ in Equation (25),
∂xci,t′∆(p
c
t′∆)
∂xci,t∆(p
c
t∆)
=
{
−1, if t′ = t+ 1
0, if t′ > t+ 1
, (74)
and
∂(zci,t′∆ + x
c
i,t′∆(p
c
t′∆))
∂xci,t∆(p
c
t∆)
= 0, t′ > t. (75)
So the first-order condition reduces to
E
[
(1− e−r∆)
(
vi,t∆ − λ
r
(zci,t∆ + x
c
i,t∆(p
c
t∆))
)
− pct∆ + e−r∆pc(t+1)∆
∣∣∣Hi,t∆, pct∆] = 0. (76)
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Because the price is a martingale, i.e. E
[
pc(t+1)∆ | Hi,t∆, pct∆
]
= pct∆, the above equation reduces to
the conjecture (15).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We conjecture that traders use the following linear, symmetric and stationary strategy:
xj,t∆(p; sj,t∆, zj,t∆) = asj,t∆ − bp+ dzj,t∆ + fZ. (77)
This conjecture implies the market-clearing prices of
p∗t∆ =
a
nb
n∑
j=1
sj,t∆ +
d+ nf
nb
Z. (78)
Fix a history Hi,t∆ and a realization of
∑
j 6=i sj,t∆. We use the single-deviation principle to con-
struct an equilibrium strategy (77): under the conjecture that other traders j 6= i use strategy (77)
in every period t′ ≥ t, and that trader i returns to strategy (77) in period t′ ≥ t + 1, we verify that
trader i has no incentive to deviate from strategy (77) in period t.23
If trader i uses an alternative demand schedule in period t, he faces the residual demand−∑j 6=i xj,t∆(pt∆)
and is effectively choosing a price pt∆ and getting xi,t∆(pt∆) = −
∑
j 6=i xj,t∆(pt∆). Therefore, by dif-
ferentiating trader i’s expected utility in period t with respect to pt∆ and evaluating it at pt∆ = p
∗
t∆
in Equation (78), we obtain the following first order condition in period t of trader i:
E
[
(n− 1)b ·
(
(1− e−r∆)
∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆
∂(zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆)
∂x∗i,t∆
(
vi,(t+k)∆ −
λ
r
(zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆)
)
−
∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆
∂x∗i,(t+k)∆
∂x∗i,t∆
p∗(t+k)∆
)
−
∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆ x∗i,(t+k)∆
∂p∗(t+k)∆
∂pt∆
∣∣∣∣∣ Hi,t∆ ∪ {∑j 6=i sj,t∆}
]
= 0,
(79)
where we write x∗i,(t+k)∆ = xi,(t+k)∆(p
∗
(t+k)∆; si,(t+k)∆, zi,(t+k)∆) for the strategy xi,(t+k)∆( · ) defined in
Equation (77), and by definition zi,(t+k+1)∆ = zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆.
Since all traders follow the conjectured strategy in Equation (77) from period t+ 1 and onwards,
we have the following evolution of inventories: for any k ≥ 1,
zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆ =asi,(t+k)∆ − bp∗(t+k)∆ + fZ + (1 + d)zi,(t+k)∆ (80)
=(asi,(t+k)∆ − bp∗(t+k)∆ + fZ) + (1 + d)(asi,(t+k−1)∆ − bp∗(t+k−1)∆ + fZ)
+ · · ·+ (1 + d)k−1(asi,(t+1)∆ − bp∗(t+1)∆ + fZ) + (1 + d)k(xi,t∆ + zi,t∆).
The evolution of prices and inventories, given by Equations (78) and (80), reveals that by changing
the demand or price in period t, trader i has the following effects on inventories and prices in period
23For a description of the single-deviation principle, also called “one-stage deviation principle”, see Theorem
4.1 and 4.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). We can apply their Theorem 4.2 because the payoff function in our
model, which takes the form of a “discounted” sum of period-by-period payoffs, satisfies the required “continuity
at infinity” condition.
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t+ k, k ≥ 1:
∂(zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆)
∂x∗i,t∆
= (1 + d)k, (81)
∂x∗i,(t+k)∆
∂x∗i,t∆
= (1 + d)k−1d, (82)
∂p∗(t+k)∆
∂pt∆
=
∂p∗(t+k)∆
∂x∗i,t∆
= 0. (83)
As we verify later, the equilibrium value of d satisfies −1 < d < 0, so the partial derivatives (81) and
(82) converge.
The first order condition (79) simplifies to:
E
[
(n− 1)b
(
(1− e−r∆)
∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆(1 + d)k
(
vi,(t+k)∆ −
λ
r
(zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆)
)
− p∗t∆ −
∞∑
k=1
e−rk∆(1 + d)k−1d p∗(t+k)∆
)
− x∗i,t∆
∣∣∣∣∣ Hi,t∆ ∪ {∑j 6=i sj,t∆}
]
= 0, (84)
where we have (cf. Lemma 1, Equations (78) and (80)):
E
[
p∗i,(t+k)∆ | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i sj,t∆
}]
= p∗t∆, (85)
E
[
vi,(t+k)∆ | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i sj,t∆
}]
= E
[
vi,t∆ | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i sj,t∆
}]
= αsi,t∆ +
1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆, (86)
E
[
zi,(t+k)∆ + x
∗
i,(t+k)∆ | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i sj,t∆
}]
= (asi,t∆ − bp∗t∆ + fZ)
(
1
−d −
(1 + d)k
−d
)
+ (1 + d)k(x∗i,t∆ + zi,t∆). (87)
Substituting Equations (78), (85), (86) and (87) into the first-order condition (84) and using the
notation s¯t∆ =
∑
1≤j≤n sj,t∆/n, we get:
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)
[
1
1− e−r∆(1 + d)
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆ −
(
a
b
s¯t∆ +
d+ nf
nb
Z
)
−
∞∑
k=0
λ
r
e−rk∆(1 + d)k
(
1
−d −
(1 + d)k
−d
)(
asi,t∆ − b
(
a
b
s¯t∆ +
d+ nf
nb
Z
)
+ fZ
)
− λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)r (x
∗
i,t∆ + zi,t∆)
]
− x∗i,t∆ = 0. (88)
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Rearranging the terms gives:(
1 +
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)r
)
x∗i,t∆ (89)
= (n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)
[
1
1− e−r∆(1 + d)
(
nα− 1
n− 1 si,t∆ +
n− nα
n− 1 s¯t∆ −
a
b
s¯t∆
)
− λe
−r∆(1 + d)
r(1− (1 + d)e−r∆)(1− (1 + d)2e−r∆) a(si,t∆ − s¯t∆)
− λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)rzi,t∆
−
(
1
1− e−r∆(1 + d)
(
d+ nf
nb
+
λ
rn
)
− λ
(1− (1 + d)2e−r∆)nr
)
Z
]
.
On the other hand, substituting Equation (78) into the conjectured strategy (77) gives:
x∗i,t∆ = a(si,t∆ − s¯t∆) + dzi,t∆ −
d
n
Z. (90)
We match the coefficients in Equation (90) with those in Equation (89). First of all, we clearly have
a = b. (91)
We also obtain two equations for b and d:(
1 +
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)r
)
=
(1− e−r∆)(nα− 1)
1− e−r∆(1 + d) −
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)e−r∆(1 + d)λ
(1− (1 + d)e−r∆)(1− (1 + d)2e−r∆)r ,(
1 +
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)r
)
d = −(n− 1)b(1− e
−r∆)λ
(1− e−r∆(1 + d)2)r . (92)
There are two solutions to the above system of equations. One of them leads to unbounded inventories,
so we drop it.24 The other solution leads to converging inventories and is given by
b =
(nα− 1)r
2(n− 1)e−r∆λ
(
(nα− 1)(1− e−r∆) + 2e−r∆ −
√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆
)
, (93)
d = − 1
2e−r∆
(
(nα− 1)(1− e−r∆) + 2e−r∆ −
√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆
)
. (94)
Lastly, matching the coefficient of Z gives:
f = −d
n
− bλ
nr
. (95)
Under the condition nα > 2, we can show that b > 0 and −1 < d < 0, that is, the demand schedule
is downward-sloping in price and the inventories evolutions (81)–(82) converge.
24This dropped solution to Equation (92) has the property of (1+d)e−r∆ < −1, which leads to an unbounded
path of inventories (cf. Equation (80)) and utilities.
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By Equation (19), the condition nα > 2 is equivalent to the condition
χ2 <
(n− 2)σ2w
nσ2
(96)
which is equivalent to the following condition on the fundamentals:
1
n/2 + σ2 /σ
2
D
<
√
n− 2
n
σw
σ
. (97)
Finally, we verify the second-order condition. Under the linear strategy in Equation (77) with
b > 0, differentiating the first-order condition (79) with respect to p0 gives
(n− 1)b(1− e−r∆)
(
−λ
r
(n− 1)b
∞∑
k=0
e−rk∆(1 + d)2k − 1
)
− (n− 1)b < 0. (98)
This completes the construction of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that every trader i use the strategy:
xi,t∆(p) =
∑
Tl≤t∆
alSi,Tl + awwi,t∆ − bp+ dzi,t∆ + f, (99)
where {al}l≥0, aw, b, d and f are constants. We show that for everyone using strategy (99) to be a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), the constants must be the ones given by Proposition 2. We divide
our arguments into two steps.
Step 1. Define xl ≡ al/aw. 25 As a first step, we show that if strategy (99) is a symmetric PBE,
then we must have xl = χ for every l, where χ is defined in Equation (19).
Suppose that (t− 1)∆ ∈ [Tk′ , Tk′+1) and t∆ ∈ [Tk, Tk+1), so there are k − k′ ≥ 1 dividend shocks
between time (t − 1)∆ and time t∆. 26 Without loss of generality, assume k′ = 0. Since all other
traders j 6= i are using strategy (99), by computing the difference p∗t∆ − p∗(t−1)∆, trader i can infer
from the period-t price the value of
∑
j 6=i
k∑
l=1
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1 .
By the projection theorem for normal distribution, we have
E
[
DTk −DT0 | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i
∑
Tl≤t∆
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
}]
(100)
=E
[
DTk −DT0 | {Si,Tl}kl=1 ∪
{∑
j 6=i
∑k
l=1
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
}]
= u Σ−1 ·
(
Si,T1 , . . . , Si,Tk ,
∑
j 6=i
∑k
l=1
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
)′
,
25Clearly, we cannot have aw = 0, since players use their private values in any equilibrium.
26In period t = 0, we take DT−1 = wi,T−1 = 0.
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where Σ is the covariance matrix of
(
Si,T1 , . . . , Si,Tk ,
∑
j 6=i
∑k
l=1 xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
)
: for 1 ≤ l ≤
k + 1 and 1 ≤ m ≤ k + 1,
Σl,m =

σ2D + σ
2
 1 ≤ l = m ≤ k
0 1 ≤ l 6= m ≤ k
(n− 1)(∑kl′=1 x2l′)(σ2D + σ2 ) + (n− 1)kσ2w l = m = k + 1
+(n− 1)(n− 2)∑kl′=1 x2l′σ2D
(n− 1)xlσ2D 1 ≤ l ≤ k,m = k + 1
, (101)
and Σk+1,l = Σl,k+1. And u is a row vector of covariances between(
Si,T1 , . . . , Si,Tk ,
∑
j 6=i
∑k
l=1 xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
)
and DTk −DT0 :
u = (σ2D, . . . , σ
2
D, (n− 1)
∑k
l=1
xlσ
2
D). (102)
Therefore, we have
E
[
vi,t∆ | Hi,t∆ ∪
{∑
j 6=i
∑
Tl≤t∆
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
}]
(103)
=wi,Tk + E[DT0 | {Si,T0} ∪
{∑
j 6=i x0Sj,T0 + wj,0
}
]
+ u Σ−1 ·
(
Si,T1 , . . . , Si,Tk ,
∑
j 6=i
∑k
l=1
xlSj,Tl + wj,Tl − wj,Tl−1
)′
.
Since we look for a symmetric equilibrium in which everyone plays strategy (99), trader i’s condi-
tional value in Equation (103) must place a weight of xl on Si,Tl , 1 ≤ l ≤ k, which implies that
u Σ−1 = x, (104)
where x = (x1, . . . , xk, y) and y is an arbitrary number. Clearly, Equation (104) is equivalent to
u = x Σ,
which implies (from the first k entries of the row vector)
σ2D = xl(σ
2
D + σ
2
 ) + y(n− 1)xlσ2D, 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
i.e.,
x1 = · · · = xk = σ
2
D
σ2D + σ
2
 + y(n− 1)σ2D
.
Now define x ≡ x1 = · · · = xk. Applying Lemma 1 to the conditional value in Equation (103)
implies that for the conditional value in Equation (103) to place a weight of x on Si,Tl , 1 ≤ l ≤ k, we
must have x = χ.
Step 2. Given Step 1, we can rewrite the strategy (99) as
xi,t∆(p) = aw · α si,t∆ − bp+ dzi,t∆ + f, (105)
where si,t∆ is the total signal defined in Equation (20) and α is defined in Equation (21). The
equilibrium construction in Appendix C.3 then uniquely determines the values of aw, b, d and f . This
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concludes the proof of Proposition 3.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The exponential convergence to efficient allocation follows directly from Equation (36).
Now we prove the comparative statics. We write
η ≡ nα− 1. (106)
and recall that
1 + d =
1
2e−r∆
(√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆ − (nα− 1)(1− e−r∆)
)
,
=
2√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆ + (nα− 1)(1− e−r∆) . (107)
We first note that ∂(1+d)∂η < 0.
1. The comparative statics with respect to r follow by straightforward calculations showing that
∂(1+d)
∂r < 0.
2. As σ2D increases, the left-hand side of Equation (19) increases, and hence the solution χ to
Equation (19) increases, which means that nα decreases because according to Equation (21) nα
is a decreasing function of χ2. Thus, ∂η
∂σ2D
< 0, and ∂(1+d)
∂σ2D
> 0.
3. As σ2w increases, the left-hand side of Equation (19) increases, and hence the solution χ to
Equation (19) increases; by Equation (19) this means that σ2w/χ
2 must increase as well. Thus,
nα increases because according to Equation (21) nα is an increasing function of σ2w/χ
2. Hence,
∂η
∂σ2w
> 0 and ∂(1+d)
∂σ2w
< 0.
4. We can rewrite Equation (19) as
1
1
α +
σ2
σ2D
= χ, (108)
and Equation (21) as
χ =
√
1− α
nα− 1
σw
σ
, (109)
and hence
1
n
η+1 +
σ2
σ2D
=
√
n− η − 1
nη
σw
σ
. (110)
From Equation (110) is it straightforward to show that η must increase with n. Thus, 1 + d
decreases in n.
5. For the comparative statics with respect to ∆, direction calculation shows that ∂(1+d)/∂∆ < 0.
C.6 Proofs of Propositions 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10
We first establish some general properties of the equilibrium welfare, before specializing to the optimal
trading frequency given scheduled (Appendices C.6.1 and C.6.2) and stochastic (Appendix C.6.3)
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arrivals of new information, as well as to the rate that inefficiency vanishes as n → ∞ (Appendix
C.6.4).
Lemma 2. For any profile of inventories (z1, z2, . . . , zn) satisfying
∑n
i=1 zi = Z and any profile of
total signals (s1,t∆, s2,t∆, . . . , sn,t∆), we have:
n∑
i=1
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
 zci,(t+1)∆ − λ2r (zci,(t+1)∆)2

−
n∑
i=1
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
 zi − λ
2r
(zi)
2

=
λ
2r
n∑
i=1
(zci,(t+1)∆ − zi)2. (111)
Remark. Recall that zci,(t+1)∆ = z
e
i,t∆ is the competitive allocation given total signals {si,t∆}ni=1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since (zi)
2 = (zci,(t+1)∆)
2 + 2zci,(t+1)∆(zi − zci,(t+1)∆) + (zi − zci,(t+1)∆)2, we have:
n∑
i=1
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
 zi − λ
2r
(zi)
2

=
n∑
i=1
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
 zci,(t+1)∆ − λ2r (zci,(t+1)∆)2

+
n∑
i=1
αsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
− λ
r
zci,(t+1)∆
 (zi − zci,(t+1)∆) (112)
− λ
2r
n∑
i=1
(zi − zci,(t+1)∆)2.
The middle term in Equation (112) is zero becauseαsi,t∆ + 1− α
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
sj,t∆
− λ
r
zci,(t+1)∆ = p
c
t∆ (113)
for the competitive equilibrium price pct∆ (cf. Equations (15) and (23)), and
∑n
i=1 p
c
t∆(zi − zci,(t+1)) =
pct∆(Z − Z) = 0.
Lemma 3.
X1(∆) =
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zci,∆)2] +
∞∑
t=1
e−rt∆
n∑
i=1
E[(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)2]
)
. (114)
Proof of Lemma 3. We first simplify the squared difference between the strategic and competitive
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equilibrium allocation, for t ≥ 1:
E[(z∗i,(t+1)∆ − zci,(t+1)∆)2] = (1 + d)2E[(z∗i,t∆ − zci,(t+1)∆)2]
= (1 + d)2E[(z∗i,t∆ − zci,t∆)2] + (1 + d)2E[(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)2], (115)
where the first equality follows from Proposition 4, and the second equality follows from the fact that
z∗i,t∆ and z
c
i,t∆ are measurable with respect to the information in period t − 1, and that {zci,t∆}t≥0 is
a martingale, so E[(z∗i,t∆ − zci,t∆)(zci,(t+1)∆ − zci,t∆)] = 0 by the law of iterated expectations. Then by
induction, we have:
E[(z∗i,(t+1)∆−zci,(t+1)∆)2] = (1+d)2(t+1)E[(zi,0−zci,∆)2]+
t∑
t′=1
(1+d)2(t−t
′+1)E[(zci,(t′+1)∆−zci,t′∆)2]. (116)
The above equation says that after auction t, allocative inefficiency is a linear combination of the
inefficiency in initial allocations and the time variations in the competitive allocation up to time t∆.
Applying Lemma 2, we express X1 as the weighted quadratic difference between the strategic and
competitive allocations:
X1(∆) = (1− e−r∆) · λ
2r
n∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆E[(z∗i,(t+1)∆ − zci,(t+1)∆)2]. (117)
Substituting Equation (116) into the expression of X1 in Equation (117), we get:
X1(∆)
=
λ(1− e−r∆)
2r
n∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆
(
(1 + d)2(t+1)E[(zi,0 − zci,∆)2] +
t∑
t′=1
(1 + d)2(t−t
′+1)E[(zci,(t′+1)∆ − zci,t′∆)2]
)
=
λ
2r
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)2
1− (1 + d)2e−r∆
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zci,∆)2]
+
1− e−r∆
r
λ
2
n∑
i=1
∞∑
t′=1
E[(zci,(t′+1)∆ − zci,t′∆)2]
∞∑
t=t′
e−rt∆(1 + d)2(t−t
′+1)
=
λ
2r
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)2
1− (1 + d)2e−r∆
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zci,∆)2]
+
λ
2r
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)2
1− (1 + d)2e−r∆
n∑
i=1
∞∑
t′=1
E[(zci,(t′+1)∆ − zci,t′∆)2]e−rt
′∆. (118)
We can simplify the constant in the above equations by a direct calculation:
e−r∆(1 + d)2 (119)
=
2(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆ − 2(nα− 1)(1− e−r∆)
√
(nα− 1)2(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e−r∆
4e−r∆
= 1− (nα− 1)(1− e−r∆)(1 + d),
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which implies:
(1− e−r∆)(1 + d)2
1− (1 + d)2e−r∆ =
1 + d
nα− 1 . (120)
C.6.1 Proof of Proposition 5
For any τ > 0, we let t(τ) = min{t ≥ 0 : t ∈ Z, t∆ ≥ τ}. That is, if new signals arrive at the clock
time τ , then t(τ)∆ is the clock time of the next trading period (including time τ).
For any ∆ ≤ γ, by the assumption of Proposition 5 there is at most one new signal profile arrival
in each interval [t∆, (t + 1)∆). Thus, we only need to count the changes in competitive allocation
between period t((k − 1)γ) and t(kγ), for k ∈ Z+. Using this fact, we can rewrite X1(∆) and X2(∆)
as:
X1(∆) =
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2] +
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
e−rt(kγ)∆E[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2]
)
=
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2] +
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
e−rkγE[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2]
)
− λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
(e−rkγ − e−rt(kγ)∆)E[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2]. (121)
and
X2(∆) =
λ
2r
n∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
∫ (t+1)∆
τ=t∆
re−rτE[(zei,t∆ − zei,τ )2] dτ (122)
=
λ
2r
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
(e−rkγ − e−rt(kγ)∆)E[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2].
Note that all the expectations in the expressions of X1(∆) and X2(∆) do not depend on ∆. To
make clear the dependence of d on ∆, we now write d = d(∆). Since (1 + d(∆))/(nα − 1) < 1, we
have for any ∆ < γ:
X(∆) = X1(∆) +X2(∆) (123)
>
λ(1 + d(∆))
2r(nα− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2] +
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
e−rkγE[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2]
)
>
λ(1 + d(γ))
2r(nα− 1)
(
n∑
i=1
E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2] +
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=1
e−rkγE[(zei,kγ − zei,(k−1)γ)2]
)
= X(γ),
where the last inequality holds because d(∆) decreases with ∆ (which can be verified by taking
derivative the d′(∆)) and where the last equality holds because t(kγ)∆ = kγ if γ = ∆. Therefore, we
have W (∆) < W (γ) for any ∆ < γ. This proves Proposition 5.
Notice that for this lower bound of ∆∗ ≥ γ we make no use of the assumption that E[(zei,kγ −
zei,(k−1)γ)
2] is a constant independent of k. Thus ∆∗ ≥ γ also holds if traders have no common value
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but have private value shocks wi,kγ − wi,(k−1)γ that are non-stationary in k.
C.6.2 Proof of Proposition 6
If ∆ = lγ, where l ≥ 1 is an integer, we have:
X1(lγ) =
λ(1 + d(lγ))
2r(nα− 1)
(
σ20 +
∞∑
t=0
e−r(t+1)lγlσ2z
)
=
λ(1 + d(lγ))
2r(nα− 1)
(
σ20 +
e−rlγ
1− e−rlγ lσ
2
z
)
, (124)
X2(lγ) =
λ
2r
1
1− e−rlγ
(
(e−γr − e−2γr) + 2(e−2γr − e−3γr) + · · ·+ (l − 1)(e−(l−1)γr − e−lγr)
)
σ2z
=
λ
2r
1
1− e−rlγ
(
e−γr + e−2γr + e−3γr + · · ·+ e−(l−1)γr − (l − 1)e−lγr
)
σ2z
=
λ
2r
1
1− e−rlγ
(
1− e−rlγ
1− e−γr − 1− (l − 1)e
−rlγ
)
σ2z
=
λ
2r
(
1
1− e−γr − 1− l
e−rlγ
1− e−rlγ
)
σ2z . (125)
Hence, if ∆ = lγ, l ∈ Z+, we have:
X(lγ) =
λ(1 + d(lγ))
2r(nα− 1) σ
2
0 −
λ
2r
(
1− 1 + d(lγ)
nα− 1
)
le−rlγ
1− e−rlγ σ
2
z +
λe−γr
2r(1− e−γr)σ
2
z . (126)
By taking derivative, we can show that the function (involved in the first term in Equation (126))
1 + d(∆)
nα− 1 =
1
2e−r∆
(√
(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e
−r∆
(nα− 1)2 − (1− e
−r∆)
)
is strictly decreasing in ∆, while (
1− 1 + d(∆)
nα− 1
)
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆
involved in the second term in Equation (126) is also strictly decreasing in ∆.
We first prove part 2 of Proposition 6. As n tends to infinity, the proof of Proposition 10 implies
that nα tends to infinity as well. As nα → ∞, (1 + d(lγ))/(nα − 1) → 0 for every l ∈ Z+, and
by assumption σ20/σ
2
z remains bounded, so the second term in Equation (126) dominates, and hence
X(lγ) is minimized at l∗ = 1.
For part 1 of Proposition 6, suppose zi,0 = Z/n for every i, so we have σ
2
0 = σ
2
z . Minimizing X(lγ)
over positive integers l is equivalent to maximizing W˜ (lγ) over l:
W˜ (lγ) ≡ log
(
1− 1 + d(lγ)
nα− 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
le−rlγ
1− e−rlγ
)
. (127)
We have:
W˜ = log
(
1 + δ −
√
(1− δ)2 + 4δy
)
− log(2δ) + log
(
1− log(δ)δ
rγ(1− δ)
)
, (128)
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where
δ ≡ e−rlγ , y ≡ 1
(nα− 1)2 . (129)
We calculate:
dW˜
dδ
=
1− δ −√1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ)
2δ
√
1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ) +
δ − 1− log(δ)
(1− δ)(rγ(1− δ)− δ log(δ)) . (130)
Clearly,
1−δ−
√
1+δ(−2+4y+δ)
2δ
√
1+δ(−2+4y+δ) is decreasing in y, and y ∈ (0, 1), so
1− δ −√1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ)
2δ
√
1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ) > −
1
1 + δ
, (131)
where the right-hand side is obtained from substituting y = 1 to the left-hand side.
Thus,
dW˜
dδ
> − 1
1 + δ
+
δ − 1− log(δ)
(1− δ)(rγ(1− δ)− δ log(δ)) > 0, (132)
if and only if
− (1 + δ
2) log(δ)
(1− δ)2 −
1− δ2
(1− δ)2 > rγ, (133)
which is satisfied whenever 0 ≤ δ ≤ e−1.5rγ : the left-hand side is decreasing in δ, and is equal to
1−e3rγ+1.5(1+e3rγ)rγ
(e1.5rγ−1)2 > rγ when δ = e
−1.5rγ . This proves that the l∗ that maximizes W˜ (and hence
minimizes X) satisfies l∗ ≤ 2.
To show that l∗ = 1, we calculate that:∫ e−rγ
e−2rγ
dW˜
dδ
dδ >
∫ e−rγ
e−2rγ
− 1
1 + δ
+
δ − 1− log(δ)
(1− δ)(rγ(1− δ)− δ log(δ)) dδ = log
(
rγ(δ − 1) + δ log(δ)
1− δ2
)∣∣∣∣e−rγ
e−2rγ
= 0.
(134)
C.6.3 Proofs of Proposition 7 and Proposition 8
We have:
X1(∆) =
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
σ20 +
∞∑
t=0
e−r(t+1)∆∆µσ2z
)
(135)
=
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)
(
σ20 +
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆µσ
2
z
)
and
X2(∆) =
λ
2r
∞∑
t=0
e−rt∆
∫ ∆
τ=0
re−rττµσ2z dτ = −
λ
2r
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆µσ
2
z +
λ
2r2
µσ2z . (136)
Therefore,
X(∆) =
λ(1 + d)
2r(nα− 1)σ
2
0 −
λ
2r
(
1− 1 + d
nα− 1
)
∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆µσ
2
z +
λ
2r2
µσ2z . (137)
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We note that the above is the same expression as Equation (126) in the proof of Proposition 6, replacing
µ with 1/γ and ∆ with lγ, and ignoring the last term which is independent of ∆. The result (Part 2 of
Proposition 8) for n→∞ has the same proof as that in Proposition 6. For Part 1 of Proposition 8, we
note that as established in the proof of Proposition 6, 1+dnα−1 and
(
1− 1+dnα−1
)
∆e−r∆
1−e−r∆ are both decreasing
in ∆, so ∂
2X
∂∆∂µ > 0 and as µ becomes larger the second term becomes more important than the first
term.
For the proof of Proposition 7, suppose that zi,0 = Z/n for every trader i. Then we have σ
2
0 = σ
2
z .
Minimizing X(∆) over ∆ is equivalent to maximizing W˜ (∆) over ∆, where:
W˜ (∆) ≡ log
(
1− 1 + d(∆)
nα− 1
)
+ log
(
1 +
µ∆e−r∆
1− e−r∆
)
. (138)
We have:
W˜ = log
(
1 + δ −
√
(1− δ)2 + 4δy
)
− log(2δ) + log
(
1− µ log(δ)δ
r(1− δ)
)
, (139)
where
δ ≡ e−r∆, y ≡ 1
(nα− 1)2 . (140)
We calculate:
dW˜
dδ
=
1− δ −√1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ)
2δ
√
1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ) +
δ − 1− log(δ)
(1− δ)((1− δ)r/µ− δ log(δ)) , (141)
We note that the first term in the righthand side of Equation (141) is negative, while the second term
is positive. Moreover,
−1− δ −
√
1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ)
2δ
√
1 + δ(−2 + 4y + δ)
/
δ − 1− log(δ)
(1− δ)((1− δ)r/µ− δ log(δ))
is increasing in δ, tends to 0 as δ → 0, and tends to 1 + r/µ as δ → 1. Therefore, there exists a unique
δ∗ at which dW˜dδ = 0, and such δ
∗ maximizes W˜ .
Equation (141) implies that
d2 W˜
dδ dy
= − (1− δ)
(1 + δ(4y + δ − 2))3/2 < 0 (142)
for every δ ∈ (0, 1) and y ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the optimal δ∗ that maximizes W˜ is strictly decreasing
with y, i.e., the optimal ∆∗ that maximizes W˜ is strictly decreasing with nα. We have previously
established that α is increasing with σ2w and is decreasing with σ
2
D, and nα is increasing with n. This
concludes the proof of Part 2 for Proposition 7.
From Equation (141), we have dW˜dδ > 0 if
y <
(1− δ)2
4δ
((
(1− δ)((1− δ)r/µ− δ log(δ))
(1− δ)2r/µ+ 2δ(1− δ) + (δ2 + δ) log(δ)
)2
− 1
)
. (143)
After substituting δ = e−r/(lµ), the righthand side of the above equation is increasing in r/µ if l ≥ 2/3.
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As r/µ → 0, the righthand side tends to 9/(6l − 1)2. This shows that for any l ≥ 2/3, we have
∆∗ < 1/(lµ) if nα > 2l + 2/3. Thus we have proved Part 1 of Proposition 7.
C.6.4 Proofs of Proposition 10
Suppose that T0 = 0 and {Tk}k≥1 is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity µ > 0. (The proof
for scheduled information arrivals Tk = kγ is analogous and omitted.)
Lemma 3 then implies that
X1(∆)
n
=
λ(1 + d(∆))
2r(nα− 1) ·
(∑n
i=1 E[(zi,0 − zei,0)2]
n
+
e−r∆µ∆
1− e−r∆
∑n
i=1 E[(zei,Tk − zei,Tk−1)2]
n
)
, (144)
where for any k ≥ 1,∑n
i=1 E[(zei,Tk − zei,Tk−1)2]
n
=
(
r(nα− 1)
λ(n− 1)
)2 (n− 1)(χ2(σ2D + σ2 ) + σ2w)
nα2
, (145)
by Equation (47).
Equation (145) tends to a positive constant as n→∞ (since χ→ 0 as n→∞), and lim∆→0 e−r∆µ∆1−e−r∆ =
µ
r . By assumption,
∑n
i=1 E[(zi,0−zei,0)2]/n is bounded as n→∞. Thus, for limn→∞X1(∆)/n it suffices
to analyze
1 + d(∆)
nα− 1 =
1
2e−r∆
(√
(1− e−r∆)2 + 4e
−r∆
(nα− 1)2 − (1− e
−r∆)
)
. (146)
Suppose σ2D > 0. Equation (110) (where η ≡ nα − 1) implies that nα is of order n2/3 as n → ∞.
To see this, first note that η → ∞ and η/n → 0 as n → ∞, for otherwise the left-hand side and
right-hand side of Equation (110) cannot match. Suppose that as n becomes large, η is of order ny
for some y < 1. The left-hand side of Equation (110) is of order ny−1, and the right-hand side is of
order n−y/2. Thus, y = 2/3.
For any fixed ∆ > 0, it is straightforward to use Taylor expansion to calculate that, as n becomes
large,
1 + d(∆)
nα− 1 =
1
1− e−r∆ (nα− 1)
−2 +O((nα− 1)−4).
Therefore, (1 + d(∆))/(nα− 1) and hence X1(∆)/n are of order n−4/3.
But if we first take the limit ∆→ 0, we clearly have
lim
∆→0
1 + d(∆)
nα− 1 =
1
nα− 1 ,
so lim∆→0(1 + d(∆))/(nα− 1) and hence lim∆→0X1(∆)/n are of order n−2/3.
If σ2D = 0, then nα = n. The same calculation as above shows that X1(∆)/n is of order n
−2 for a
fixed ∆ > 0 but is of order n−1 if we first take the limit ∆→ 0.
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